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ABSTRACT 
An Investigation of the Differential Effects of Two Dimensions of 
Spokesman Credibility as They Interact with Consumer 
Involvement with Brand Choice 
(February 1977) 
David W. Finn, B.B.A., University of Massachusetts 
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: Professor Kent B. Monroe 
This study examines changes in consumers' beliefs about a brand 
of toothpaste due to the influence of an advertisement. In the frame¬ 
work of the communication process, an advertising spokesman was viewed 
as the source of the communication; potential buyers were viewed as 
the audience; and beliefs were studied as destination variables. 
A review of the literature on source "credibility" suggested 
that the two most commonly recognized dimensions of source credibility-- 
expertness and trustworthiness--may have different effects on desti¬ 
nation variables, particularly as they interact with receiver involve¬ 
ment. 
An experiment using a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial design was planned with 
two levels each of source trust, source competence, and receiver in¬ 
volvement with brand choice. Advertising spokesmen that varied on the 
dimensions of trust and competence were determined with a large pre¬ 
test. Involvement with brand choice was operationally defined as 
interest in differences among brands of toothpaste. 
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The research hypotheses predicted an interaction between spokesman 
competence and receiver involvement with brand choice and no interaction 
between spokesman trust and receiver involvement. 
Specifically, it was predicted that: 1) high competence spokes¬ 
men would produce more belief change than low competence spokesmen for 
non-involved receivers; 2) high competence spokesmen would produce the 
same amount of belief change as low competence spokesmen for involved 
receivers; and 3) high trust spokesmen would produce more belief change 
than low trust spokesmen regardless of level of receiver involvement. 
Neither hypothesis was supported. The main reason was that in 
the advertising message, the trust and competence manipulations failed. 
That is, all four spokesmen were perceived to be equally low in trust 
and competence. This result was surprising, since the pre-test had 
also been done in an advertising context. It appeared that the adver¬ 
tisement itself had overpowered the credibility of the spokesman. 
Two important managerial implications emerged from the study. 
First, it was discovered that when the advertising message failed to 
mention specific salient attributes of the product, potential consum¬ 
ers began to disbelieve that the brand in question possessed these 
attributes. That is, the absence of certain statements in the message 
resulted in belief change in an unfavorable direction. These impact 
effects are potentially present in any advertisement, and the adver¬ 
tiser must be aware not only of what is stated in the advertisement, 
but also of what is left unsaid. 
Second, the value of choosing product spokesmen on the basis of 
their believability and expertness was questioned. The pre-test 
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for identifying credible spokesmen in this study was similar to 
methods used in actual spokesman choice. The manipulation failure of 
this study suggested the possibility that in actual advertisements all 
spokesmen are perceived to be equally untrustworthy and incompetent. 
Implications for this possibility were explained in the framework of 
an information processing model. 
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CHAPTER I 
SOURCE CREDIBILITY AND INVOLVEMENT 
WITH BRAND CHOICE 
Introduction 
The major purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the ef¬ 
fects of spokesman credibility on buyers' perceptions of brand attri¬ 
butes. Two buyer conditions will be studied. Specifically, two levels 
of consumer involvement with brand choice will be studied as they inter¬ 
act with two dimensions of spokesman credibility. The framework for 
this research is the concept of multi-attribute attitude models. It 
will be demonstrated that buyers' perceptions of brand attributes are 
related to buyers' attitudes toward purchasing and using the brand. A 
multi-attribute attitude model will be developed in Chapter II. 
To lay a theoretical foundation for the research, this chapter 
will first review the literature on source credibility. Following 
this, a brief discussion of the difficulties present in defining con¬ 
sumer involvement with brand choice will be presented, with further 
discussion of the involvement construct reserved for Chapter II. 
Finally, several unresolved research problems will be identified. 
To begin, a brief explanation of how this research fits into the 
area of marketing is appropriate. 
Attitude change as a marketing goal 
Marketing managers have many controllable variables available 
for stimulating and influencing sales. The list of variables that 
2 
are controllable by marketers includes price, packaging, availability, 
advertising, and point-of-purchase displays. How these different vari¬ 
ables affect sales is only partially understood. In no case are market¬ 
ers and market researchers certain when predicting the sales results 
of changing any of these decision variables. This is true because 
these managerial variables do not influence sales independently. They 
are highly interactive with each other and with non-controllable var¬ 
iables, particularly competitor actions. However, certain effects 
prior to sales are observable. 
For example, measures of exposure, awareness, comprehension, 
retention, and attitude are often used to judge the effectiveness of 
an advertisement. The desired end result of the advertisement may 
have been to increase brand sales, but it is very difficult to isolate 
the effects of a particular advertising campaign on sales. The measure 
of effectiveness, in this case, is one step removed from sales, and the 
focus is on the buyer himself. 
Most market researchers agree that buyers go through many pre¬ 
liminary stages before purchase. Measures of exposure, awareness, com¬ 
prehension, retention, and attitude reflect the researchers' beliefs 
about what the important preliminary stages might be. Most researchers 
agree that purchase will not occur prior to the awareness stage. Con¬ 
sequently, one common measure of advertising effectiveness is brand 
awareness. 
Market researchers begin to differ when it comes to acknowledging 
the importance of, or even the existence of, the other stages prior to 
3 
brand purchase. The most lively debates center around the attitude or 
"1 inability" stage. Some marketers see attitude change as an important 
step in these "hierarchy-of-effect" models of brand acceptance (see 
Robertson, 1971; Chapter 3); others feel that attitude is not at all 
important before purchase (e.g., Krugman, 1965). Although unstated, one 
acceptable assumption is that buyers will not behave favorably toward 
(that is, purchase) any brand toward which they have a negative atti¬ 
tude (that is, dislike). In many situations, then, attitude change is 
a valid marketing goal that is linked more easily than sales to a 
change in advertising strategy. The question becomes, how can adver¬ 
tising help in changing attitudes? 
Multi-attribute attitude models 
A partial answer to this question is suggested by multi-attri¬ 
bute attitude models (see Wilkie and Pessemier, 1973, for a review of 
many of these models). Basically, these models suggest that attitude 
toward a brand is a function of: (1) the specific evaluative criteria 
or attributes used by buyers to compare alternatives; (2) buyers' per¬ 
ceptions of how the alternative brands compare on these attributes; and 
(3) the importance or evaluation of each of these attributes. By re¬ 
vealing the structure of brand attitudes, these models suggest ways 
of creating attitude change. Specifically, a marketer, after discover¬ 
ing the attitudinal structure of his target market, can attempt to: 
(1) increase the number of evaluative criteria used to include one or 
more that his brand possesses; (2) change buyers' perceptions of his 
brand by either physically changing the product or convincing buyers 
that they are misperceiving it; or (3) change the value of evaluative 
criteria that his brand lacks ("bad taste is good"). 
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Most marketing work with the multi-attribute models has been con¬ 
cerned with validating them as measurement tools. Although this work 
is crucial, a real value of these models is their potential for describ¬ 
ing attitude structure and for indicating directions for marketing 
communication strategy. For example, they may help a manager discover 
that a problem is the buyers' perceptions of his brand's durability. 
This may lead to a general communications goal of changing these erro¬ 
neous perceptions. When it comes to choosing the particular advertis¬ 
ing copy or the product spokesman, however, the marketing manager must 
go beyond the models. 
Communication and change 
Since advetising is a communication variable, its effects can be 
studied in a communications context. A basic model of the communication 
process is presented in Figure 1. Any communication can be studied in 
terms of the question, "who says what, how, to whom, with what effect?" 
(see, for example, Hovland, Janis, and Kelley, 1953). Much communica¬ 
tions research tends to study the process in a stimulus-response frame¬ 
work. The stimuli are usually attributes of the source, such as his 
trustworthiness, expertness, attractiveness, status, or power; the con¬ 
tent or style of the message, such as fear appeals or conclusion draw¬ 
ing; the particular communication channel, such as face-to-face or mass 
communication; or states of the audience, such as general persuasibili- 
ty, initial attitudes, or degree of involvement with the topic. The 
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responses are generally the destination variables of the model and in¬ 
clude such things as opinion, retention, attitude, and comprehansion. 
The effect of the source of the communication on destination 
variables has been a popular area of research. Communications research¬ 
ers generally think of the source's trustworthiness and expertness as 
a single variable--credibility. One generally accepted "truth" in 
communications research is that increases in credibility of the message 
source lead to increasingly favorable effects on most destination vari¬ 
ables. This effect, however, depends on many factors that ore not 
clearly understood. One such "other factor" is the amount of receiver 
involvement with the topic of the communication. The results of research 
studying the interaction of source credibility and receiver involvement 
are not consistent. The only acceptable generalization is that the 
more involved a receiver is, the more resistant he is to change. 
Advertising can be studied in the context of this communication 
model. The source, the message, and the channel are all managerially 
manipulate; the audience can be segmented on various dimensions; and 
different effects can be observed. Advertising spokesmen can be varied 
as a communication source, while potential buyers (the audience) can be 
segmented on the basis of involvement with brand choice. An understand¬ 
ing of the interaction of spokesman and audience can help marketers 
optimize the effects of a spokesman choice. 
Source Credibility 
In the past twenty years research in credibility has taken at 
least three different directions: (1) research into ways to improve 
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the credibility of the source of a message; (2) investigation of the 
dimensions of source credibility; and (3) research on the effect of 
source credibility on some destination variable (usually called "atti¬ 
tude"). 
Improving credibility of the source 
Studies in this tradition have typically manipulated either a 
source or a message variable and observed the effect on the audience's 
perceived credibility of the source. Simons, Berkowitz and Moyer (1970), 
in reviewing several studies dealing with similarity of audience and 
source, offer the "highly tentative" proposition that 
In general, there seems to be a weak but positive relationship 
between attitudinal similarity and the factors of respect and 
trust and a still less dependable relationship between member¬ 
ship-group similarities and these same factors, (page 7) 
As will be pointed out later, trust is one important dimension of source 
credibility. 
McEwen and Greenberg (1970) found that sources delivering highly 
intense messages (defined in terms of the number of verbs and modifiers 
of known intensive value) were judged to be more trustworthy, more 
qualified and more dynamic than sources delivering less intense messages. 
Sereno and Hawkins (1967) attempted to manipulate credibility by 
varying the percentage of nonfluencies in a speech. Nonfluencies were 
defined as sentence corrections, stutters, repetitions, tongue-slip 
corrections and the sound "ah". They found that audience ratings of 
source competence and dynamism got worse with increasing percentages 
of nonfluencies; trustworthiness ratings remained constant. 
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Although these and other studies have been mainly concerned with 
investigating the interaction between source characteristics and vari¬ 
ables present during the communication, an implicit assumption of all 
of them is that any increase in source credibility will have a positive 
impact on some destination variable of interest. The results do not 
support this assumption. For example, although Sereno and Hawkins 
successfully influenced perceptions of source competence and dynamism, 
"varying amounts of nonfluency did not differentially affect the amount 
of audience attitude shift toward the topic" (page 61). Similarly, 
McEwen and Greenberg found no difference in attitude toward the topic 
between groups exposed to messages of different intensities, even though 
they rated the source different on three dimensions of credibility. 
Andersen and Clevenger (1963), in reviewing early research that 
attempted to change perceived source credibility during the message, 
dichotomized these studies "into those which have manipulated charac- 
terististics of the manuscript and those which have altered such non¬ 
manuscript stimuli as the speaker's appearance or his style of deliv¬ 
ery" (page 71). They also found no consistency in the effects of mes¬ 
sage- or situation-induced credibility on such destination variables as 
opinion change or message acceptance. 
This inconsistency is not surprising; given the nature of a per¬ 
suasive communication. Any persuasive message can be thought of as 
a series of bits of information related to the topic of the message. It 
is unreasonable to assume that members of an audience receive these 
pieces of information and store them in some temporary memory until the 
message is finished, and only then process them as acceptable or 
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believable in the light of what has been revealed in the whole message. 
This assumes an unlimited pre-processing capacity for the human organ¬ 
ism, contrary to recent findings suggesting a limit of 10 to 20 sec¬ 
onds (Neisser, 1967, chapters 8 and 9). Rather, it seems that each 
audience member must attend to, comprehend, and accept or reject each 
piece of information within a short time after it is received. This 
attention, comprehension, and acceptance is influenced by source, mes¬ 
sage, channel, and audience variables (Janis and Hovland, 1959). If 
"credibility" is induced during the message, many early bits of infor¬ 
mation are processed without its influence. Only after the message 
situation has revealed the source's competence or trust can this know¬ 
ledge aid in acceptance. By this time, however, many important argu¬ 
ments under each credibility condition will have been processed under 
close to identical source conditions (i.e., unidentified trust or 
competence). The apparently unexpected results reported above, then, 
are not surprising and do not contradict the assumption of a credibility 
effect. 
Dimensions of source credibility 
Much of the credibility research has investigated the structure 
of credibility itself. The findings indicate that source credibility 
is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. 
Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953) suggested that source credibil¬ 
ity is made up of at least trustworthiness and expertness. Although 
they were certainly not the first to suggest that credibility is multi¬ 
dimensional, their suggestions and research started a continuing re¬ 
search tradition based on this idea. 
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Berio, Lemert, and Mertz (1961), using factor analysis with many 
scales, several different sources, and a very large sample, were the 
first to scientifically isolate different dimensions of credibility. 
They labeled the three strongest factors; Qualification, Safety, and 
Dynamism. The scales that loaded most heavily on the first two might 
also suggest the labels "expertness" and "trustworthiness". It seems 
that Hovland, et al., were on the right track! 
After Berio, Lemert, and Mertz came a host of other factor ana¬ 
lysts searching for the dimensions of credibility and asking whether or 
not they were stable across subjects, situations, and sources. Some 
of these researchers found three or four factors (e.g., Markham, 1968; 
Holdridge, 1972), others found only a few (e.g., McCroskey, 1966), but 
it seems that the most consistent factors to appear are Trustworthiness 
(sometimes labeled "character" or "safety") and Expertness (also called 
"competence", "authoritativeness" or "qualification").* The end result 
of this search is a sort of axiom or accepted "truth" in the disciplines 
concerned with communications that the credibility of the source of a 
message depends at least upon his perceived competence and trust. The 
"dynamism" or "theatricalness" of the source is also a recognized 
factor, but this dimension appears to be much less stable. 
The effects of source credibility 
Many studies have been conducted on the effects of credibility 
since the work of Hovland and his associates. Although it is intuitively 
enticing to accept the notion that the persuasive impact of a 
^Throughout the remainder of this dissertation, these two factors 
will be referred to as trust and competence. 
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communication increases with increasing communicator credibility, most 
communication researchers agree that the relationship is not that simple 
and have studied credibility effects in interaction with other factors. 
Bochner and Insko (1966) and others have examined the interaction of 
credibility and discrepancy of the position advocated from the receiv¬ 
er's position. Fear or stress on the receiver has been varied with 
source credibility by Si gall and Helmreich (1969). The effect of vari¬ 
ations in receiver personality and source credibility has been inves¬ 
tigated by Johnson, Torcivia, and Poprick (1968) and Goldberg(1970). 
The results seem to be leading to no generalizable conclusion 
regarding the effects of credibility on persuasion. One possible ex¬ 
planation for this lack of consistency emerges from the observation 
that there is no consistency in operationalizing "credibility" from 
study to study. If each researcher manipulates a different dimension 
of credibility, we do not expect similar results. 
Most researchers agree that credibility is multi-dimensional. 
In fact, most conduct a manipulation check using scales designed to 
measure the various dimensions. None of them, however, seem to sus¬ 
pect that the different dimensions may influence message acceptance in 
different ways. For example: Brewer and Crano (1968) varied the 
prestige of the source; Curto and Sistrunk (1972) manipulated the 
source's race; the differential effects of the "deviousness" of the 
communicator were studied by Greenberg and Miller (1966); and Anderson 
(1973) looked at differences in competence. In addition, each of the 
above mentioned authors studied the interaction of credibility with 
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some other message or receiver variable believed to influence persuasion. 
Under these conditions, we cannot expect consistent results. 
As a first step in organizing the credibility literature, it is 
/ 
instructive to separate the studies according to apparent dimension of 
credibility manipulated. As reported above, as many as four dimensions 
of source credibility have been proposed. To limit the scope of this 
dissertation, only the two most consistent dimensions will be investi¬ 
gated, namely, competence and trust. 
Table 1 is an analysis of much of the recent credibility research 
arranged on these two dimensions. The research has been separated fur¬ 
ther according to whether or not the specific credibility manipulation 
has been successful or unsuccessful in differentially influencing the 
dependent variable. No separation has been made on the basis of de¬ 
pendent variables, even though they vary from beliefs to attitudes to 
learning. Also included in Table 1 is a description of other indepen¬ 
dent variables present in the communication. Research that varied com¬ 
binations of competence and trust are not included and will be discussed 
later. 
Trust manipulations—unsuccessful. The most noticeable thing 
about Table 1 is the absence of entries in this cell. No study that 
manipulated the trust dimension under constant competence conditions 
failed to induce differences in the dependent variable. One reason for 
this may be that only a few studies have actually manipulated the trust 
dimension alone. In fact, some of these "pure" trust manipulations 
were more accidental than planned. Many experimenters have correctly 
assumed that credibility is made up of competence and trust and have 
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compared a trustworthy expert to a deceitful fool. Any differences in 
the dependent variable are then attributed to differences in "credibil¬ 
ity", and the differential effects of competence and trust cannot be 
observed. 
Trust manipulations--successful. In some studies in this cell, 
trust was intentionally varied under constant competence conditions. In 
others, the researcher intended to manipulate both competence and trust 
but discovered, via a manipulation check, that only trust was success¬ 
fully varied. 
For example, Dutton (1973; #6 in Table 1) presented subjects with 
one of four messages. The communication was about either the question 
of whether or not the planet earth had been visited by intelligent life 
from another planet or the question of the desirability of greater gov¬ 
ernment sanctions for industrial polluters. Some subjects heard a mes¬ 
sage in favor of the issue; others heard a message opposed to the issue. 
The source credibility was varied by introduction. The high credible 
source was described as a person who had held a high position in an 
organization that dealt with the subject and had quit the organization 
over the issue (a "maverick"). He refused to "tow the party line". The 
low credible source was still employed in the same position and was 
giving a speech in line with the official position of the organization. 
A manipulation check revealed that Dutton did not succeed in cre¬ 
ating differences in perceived expertness. The sources were perceived 
to differ significantly in trustworthiness and fairness. What he had, 
then, was a trust manipulation under constant competence conditions. 
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His dependent variable was the amount of change in the subjects' extent 
of agreement with five belief statements on the topic of the message. 
Although. Dutton was. also interested in studying the differential 
effect of issues, and positions (pro or con), it is not instructive to 
discuss these. Any differences observed on these bases could as easily 
be attributed to the different messages as to the different topics or 
positions. Different messages contain different pieces of information, 
regardless of the topic, and will likely have different persuasive im¬ 
pact. The trust effect was as expected: subjects changed significantly 
more under the influence of the trustworthy source. 
Miller and Baseheart (1969; #4a and #4b) used sources that varied 
by the amount of self-interest they had in the topic of the message. 
This is a trust-type manipulation. A source that is perceived as having 
a lot at stake in the topic is a less trustworthy source of information 
than an unbiased party. By also varying the degree of opinionatedness 
in the message, they felt they were manipulating a type of fear appeal. 
The message was about the consequences of smoking and the benefits of 
not smoking and was at odds with the subjects' positions. Opinionated¬ 
ness was varied by including four more statements in the opinionated 
version than in the non-opinionated version of the message. The depen¬ 
dent variable was the subjects' attitudes toward making the sale of 
cigarettes illegal. A significant trust effect was noted for each mes¬ 
sage; the more trustworthy source was more effective. 
The other studies in this cell show similar results. In moderate 
or low fear conditions, with involving or non-involving topics, or with 
subjects with extreme or moderate attitudes toward the topic, variations 
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in source trust consistently lead to significant variations in the 
dependent variable. This is not true for variations in competence. 
Competence manipulations—unsuccessful. Any study in this cell 
/ 
that has a letter included with its number manipulated both competence 
and another variable. For some levels of that other variable, differ¬ 
ences in source competence led to significant differences in the depen¬ 
dent variable. These results are included in the competence--successful 
cell. For different levels of the other variable, differences in source 
competence failed to result in differential effects on the dependent 
variable. These unsuccessful competence effects are listed in this 
cell. 
The most interesting thing to notice about this cell is that in 
almost every study another variable believed to have a strong impact on 
persuasion was present. For example, Sherif and Hovland (1961) suggest 
that a message advocating a position close to one's own is easily assim¬ 
ilated (#8b); and that ambiguous messages are easily misinterpreted as 
agreeing with one's own position and have a high probability of falling 
into the latitude of acceptance (#10b). That is, if a message is seen 
as supporting a position that one already holds, even complete agreement 
with the message will result in no change under any competence condi¬ 
tions. Janis and Feshbach (1953) and others have generally found that 
persuasion attempts become more effective as fear or stress increases 
(#9b). Finally, Sherif, Sherif and Nebergall (1965) suggest that sub¬ 
jects who are involved with the topic of the message are more resistant 
to change. It may be that these "other variables" have a neutral 
level at which they neither facilitate nor inhibit the effect of the 
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message. As the levels of these other variables increase from neutrality, 
they begin to have an impact. When they are large enough to have an im¬ 
pact, differences in source competence fail to produce differential ef¬ 
fects. For example, non-involvement with the topic, unequivocal mes¬ 
sages, low levels of stress or fear, and discrepant messages may all be 
neutral levels of these variables that neither help nor hinder message 
acceptance. It is not clear whether or not receiver dogmatism (#12a and 
#12b) has a direct impact on message acceptance or operates through 
the competence mediator. The latter position will be proposed later. 
Goldberg (1970; #10a and 10b) presented his subjects with a two- 
sided message advocating that people should not brush their teeth often. 
It was attributed to either a dental surgeon, a factory worker, or an 
anonymous source; a competence manipulation. One version of the message 
made the explicit recommendation that people should not brush after 
every meal. The ambiguous version did not make this recommendation. 
The author implies that the messages were otherwise identical. In ad¬ 
dition, Goldberg separated his subjects on the basis of their scores on 
a standard scale of authoritarianism. The dependent variable was atti¬ 
tude toward brushing teeth; measured as the sum of "four attitude items" 
on the topic. The results included the finding that competence manip¬ 
ulations had no effect in ambiguous messages (#10b) but did have a 
significant effect in unequivocal messages (#10a). 
Rhine and Severance (1970; #lla and #1lb) predicted that students 
who were involved in the topic (tuition increases; #llb) would not dis¬ 
play differential effects due to differences in source authoritativeness. 
Non-involving topics (park acreage in Allentown, Pennsylvania;#lla), on 
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the other hand, were expected to result in significant source effects. 
Involvement was measured with an importance scale. The dependent vari¬ 
able was the change in the acceptable dollar increase in tuition or the 
change in the recommended number of park acres to be added to Allentown; 
both measured from a control group mean. The results included the 
finding that source competence manipulations had no effect for involving 
topics (#llb) but did have a significant effect for non-involving topics. 
Interestingly, the finding was not that no change was noted in the in¬ 
volving condition, but rather that both sources produced equally signif¬ 
icant changes in most acceptable postion. 
The other studies in this cell arrived at similar conclusions. 
When some other variable believed to influence message acceptance is 
present, successful competence manipulations are consistently ineffect¬ 
ive in producing differential effects on the dependent variable. 
Competence manipulations--successfu1. Only two studies in this 
cell did not specifically manipulated another variable expected to have 
an impact on persuasion. Anderson (1973; #13) introduced the source as 
another student presenting a make-up speech on the subject of the ef¬ 
fects of television violence on children. The speaker was introduced 
either as a chemistry major who drove a truck (or waitressed) during the 
summer or as a psychology major with a sociology minor who had worked 
researching the problem for a television station. A manipulation check 
revealed that subjects perceived a difference in "competence" but not 
in "character". The dependent variable was message comprehension. As 
expectd, the subjects learned more from the high competence source. 
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Harvey and Hays (1972; #l&and #12b) varied source competence with 
subjects who were either high or low in dogmatism (as measured by the 
Rokeach. E-scale). As mentioned above, it is not clear whether this re¬ 
ceiver variable is a general influencer of persuasion. Rather, dogmatism 
will probably influence the amount of dependence the receiver places 
in the source. Harvey and Hays assumed that receivers high in dogmatism 
"would not evaluate what an external authority had to say about a matter 
independently of who the authority was and that low dogmatics would more 
readily discriminate source from message and evaluate the communication 
independently of who the authority was" (page 119). These are exactly 
the results they found. High dogmatics under the different competence 
conditions differed significantly in their attitude toward the topic 
of the message. Low dogmatics did not. 
The most interesting study in Table 1, in terms of a theory of the 
change process to be offered later, is the Si gall and Helmreich study 
(1969; #9a and«b). 
These authors recognized the fact that many studies concerned with 
the effect of fear or stress actually used different messages and that 
the differential effects of stress could not be separated from the ef¬ 
fects of the different communications. They argued: 
In most experiments dealing with stress and opinion change, 
the fear manipulation affects more than the fear level of the 
subjects; the communication differs across stress conditions. 
The result is that subjects in different stress conditions 
are exposed to different communications as well as being sub¬ 
jected to various stress levels. It is difficult to con¬ 
clude that differential attitude change between stress con¬ 
ditions is, in fact, due to differing stress levels, and 
not to differential communications, (page 71) 
20 
They proceeded to investigate the relationship hetween stress and 
competence under constant message conditions. This approach allows us 
to obserye not only the effects of competence under different levels 
of stress, but also the differential effects of stress under different 
levels of competence. 
Specifically, Si gal 1 and Helmreich presented all subjects with 
an identical videotaped speech favoring the legalization of "non-habit 
forming drugs, like marijuana or LSD" for people over the age of twenty 
one. The speaker was introduced one of three ways: 
In the High-Credible-Relevant condition the speaker was intro¬ 
duced as a professor of biology and physiology at Stanford 
University, who had conducted a great deal of research on the 
effects of hallucinogenic drugs on human and animal behavior. 
The High-Credible-Irrelevant communicator was described as a 
professor of astronomy at Stanford. The Low-Credible communi¬ 
cator was presented as a postal clerk in Palo Alto, California. 
In each case the speaker was described as being "very much 
interested in the current drug question." (page 75) 
It is obvious from these introductions that the authors were vary 
ing source status and source competence. The professor of biology was 
a high status expert; the professor of astronomy was a high status non¬ 
expert; and the postal clerk was a low or moderate status non-expert. 
It must be pointed out that, although status or prestige is clearly a 
source variable, there is little or no research suggesting that it is 
directly related to persuasion. In fact,Sigall and Helmreich them¬ 
selves later pointed out that "status may be a feature of communicator 
credibility that is not terribly important for effective persuasion" 
(page 77). What we had, then, was two levels of competence (professor 
of biology" or "others") under constant trust conditions. Although no 
manipulation check on any credibility dimension was conducted, the 
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statement in the introduction that all speakers were "very much inter¬ 
ested in the current drug question" was clearly an attempt to suggest 
that the speakers were being honest. 
Stress was manipulated external to the message by convincing sub¬ 
jects that they would be participating in another experiment in a few 
minutes. In the low stress condition, subjects were told that the other 
experiment involved monitoring their galvanic skin response and blood 
pressure. Subjects in the high stress condition were told the same 
thing, but in addition, they were shown blood sampling equipment and 
told that the other experiment involved blood analysis and that a blood 
sample would be taken from them. "Observation of the subjects under 
high and low stress indicated that stress was effectively manipulated. 
Subjects under high stress appeared tense, verbally expressed apprehen¬ 
sion over having to return . . . and seemed to be generally anxious" 
(pg 75). The dependent variable was the extent of agreement, on a 9- 
point scale, with the statement: "Use of non-habit-forming drugs, like 
marijuana or LSD, should not be illegal for people who are over 21." 
The results of this study are illustrated in Table 2. Looking at 
differences in cell means for the same communicator under both high and 
low stress reveals that different levels of stress have different ef¬ 
fects only in one low competence condition (p<.025). No significant 
differential effects of stress were noted in the high competence con¬ 
dition. 
Alternatively, looking at differences in cell means for the same 
level of stress reveals that different levels of source competence have 
different effects only under conditions of low stress. This supports 
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TABLE 2 
MEAN LEVEL OF AGREEMENT 
(l=STRONGLY DISAGREE, 9=STR0NGLY AGREE) 
HIGH STRESS LOW STRESS 
HIGH COMPETENCE 
(Professor of Physiology and Biology) 5.3 = 6.9 
LOW COMPETENCE 
(Professor of Astronomy) 
(Postal Clerk) 
II V 
5.1 N/A 4.1 
ii ii 
5.8 > 3.2 
= Indicates that there was no significant difference between cell means. 
> indicates that the cell on the open end resulted in a significantly 
larger mean than the other. 
adapted from: 
Sigal1 , H., and R. Helmreich. "Opinion Change as a Function of Stress 
and Communicator Credibility." Journal of Experimental Social Psy¬ 
chology, 5^ (1969), 70-78. 
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the observation made earlier that increases in source competence seem 
to lead to greater impact on the dependent variable only when other 
facilitators or inhibitors of message acceptance are at a neutral level. 
Most other studies in this cell in Table 1 have already been dis¬ 
cussed and lead to the same conclusion. 
Other studies on the effect of credibility. Table 3 is simply a 
list of other studies reviewed that did not fit into Table 1 for one of 
two reasons: they were either unsuccessful in their "credibility" ma¬ 
nipulation; or they manipulated both trust and competence in such a 
manner that the effects could not be separated. 
For example, Helmreich, Kuiken and Collins (1968; #15) attempted 
to manipulate trust under different levels of stress and found that each 
of the three sources were perceived as "equally credible as a source of 
information about (the topic)" (pg 470). McGinnies and Ward (1974; 
#20) and Ward and McGinnies (1974; #21) introduced the source either as 
a trustworthy, knowledgeable expert or a devious, calculating person 
who knew nothing about the subject. Neither of these studies fits into 
Table 1. 
None of the studies in Table 3, although interesting and in¬ 
structive in their own way, are of interest to this dissertation. 
Their results, or lack of results, can be explained as the effect of 
either competence or trust. This dissertation is primarily concerned 
with the differential effects of each. 
Discussion 
Although communication researchers have recognized for years that 
source influence is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, only a few have 
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TABLE 3 
OTHER CREDIBILITY STUDIES 
Reference Manipulation 
14. Husek (1965) Unclear 
15. Helmreich, Kin ken and Collins (1968) Unsuccessful 
16. Johnson, Torcivia and Poprick (1968) Honest medical expert 
vs. 
dishonest quack 
17. Johnson and Scileppi (1969) Honest medical expert 
vs. 
dishonest quack 
18. Hendrick and Borden (1970) Unsuccessful 
19. McGarry and Hendrick (1974) Trust and competence 
2Q. McGinnies and Ward (1974) Trust and competence 
21. Ward and McGinnies (1974) Trust and competence 
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bothered to speculate about possible differential effects of its compo¬ 
nents. 
Kelman (1961) postulated that different characteristics of the 
source have differential effects on a receiver depending upon the 
receiver's needs. A receiver concerned with the social effects of his 
behavior will evaluate a source in terms of the source's apparent abil¬ 
ity to control the means for this social gratification. In Kelman's 
terms, this kind of social influence is Comp!iance. Identification and 
Internalization are two other processes of social influence. 
Influence based on identification occurs when the behavior accept¬ 
ed "is associated with a satisfying self-defining relationship" to the 
source (Kelman, pg 63). The necessary source component for successful 
change in this case is attractiveness. Credibility, according to Kel¬ 
man, is the most effective source characteristic for influencing accep¬ 
tance through internalization. Here, the receiver accepts influence 
congruent with his particular value system. Unfortunately, Kelman de¬ 
fines credibility as both competence and trust and makes no comments on 
the differential effects of the components. Rarick (1963; related in 
Bauer, 1967; and in Robertson, 1971) went a step further in defining 
the dimensions of the source that are effective under different con¬ 
ditions. He posited that there are two components to source credibil¬ 
ity, and he labeled them the cognitive and affective components. The 
cognitive component was described in terms of the source's prestige, 
power and competence, while trust and likability were used to define the 
affective dimension. His conclusion suggested that these two components 
act differently on attitude change and on retention of information. 
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The relative effectiveness of different source components, accord¬ 
ing to Bauer (1967), depend, in part, upon whether the receiver is 
engaged in the psychosocial game or the problem solving game. The 
psychosocial game is played by a receiver motivated to ingratiate 
others or defend his ego. This is very similar to Kelman's notions of 
receiver compliance and identification. Receivers motivated to cope 
with problems of the real world other than the problems of social 
relations are playing the problem solving game. This is related to 
internalization in Kelman's paradigm. Like Kelman, Bauer posits that 
receivers playing the problem solving game respond to sources perceived 
as competent and trustworthy, while psychosocial game players respond 
most favorably to source power and likeability. Support for this 
proposition had been reported by Bauer and Wortzel (1966). They found 
that in considering drugs of increasing riskiness (higher liklihood 
of playing the problem solving game), doctors turned increasingly 
toward other physicians rather than following the advice of commercial 
drug-information sources. 
Bauer further suggested the possibility that source trust may 
have a different effect than source competence and described an ex¬ 
periment of Hilibrand (1964) that investigated this possibility. 
Hilibrand compared two levels each of trust and competence. It is 
unclear from Bauer's description whether any other variable was in¬ 
tentionally included, although he suggests that the topic of the 
message was of such seriousness (civil defense) that there was a 
constraint against playing the psychosocial game. As expected, those 
exposed to the high-trust, high-competence source displayed signifi- 
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cantly more favorable opinions than those exposed to the low-trust, 
low-competence source. This was only one portion of the study. The 
main topic of interest for this experiment was the effect of counter¬ 
propaganda on these groups. Although that topic is certainly important 
and interesting, for the purpose of this dissertation the Hilibrand 
study is valuable primarily because it suggested that source trust and 
source competence are separately manipul able in one experiment. Un¬ 
fortunately, Hilibrand did not vary any other factor that might affect 
message acceptance and his results concerning opinion change are 
neither exciting nor unexpected. 
An understanding of the work of both Kelman and Bauer leads to 
the belief that the results reported in Table 1 are logical. That is, 
receivers who are involved with the topic of the communication or are 
receiving the message under conditions of stress or fear will probably 
look for and respond to different source characteristics than non- 
involved receivers or receivers who are not under conditions of stress 
or fear. Kelman and Bauer have called for researchers to look at 
source effects from the receiver's viewpoint. Table 1 has helped us 
to tentatively identify some receiver variables worth studying. 
Involvement with Brand Choice 
\ 
Involvement is a very ill-defined concept in the social psychology 
literature, in the communication literature, and in the marketing lit¬ 
erature. The only agreement seems to be that involvement refers to 
something internal to the consumer. For example; Kerhy 0975) states, 
"ego-involvement is a mental commitment that occurs when a person takes 
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a position, and feels compelled to retain it because to do otherwise 
would require an admission that he was originally in error" (pg 381); 
Freedman (1964) defines involvement as, "a general level of interest 
in or concern about an issue without reference to a specific position" 
(pg 290); Day (1974) argues that involvement "describes the general 
level of interest in the object" (pg 131); and Hupfer and Gardner (1971) 
and Rhine and Severance (1970) suggest that the importance of issues 
defines the level of involvement. 
With so many conceptions of "involvement", it is not surprising 
that operational definitions also vary across a spectrum of possibil¬ 
ities. Initially, degree of involvement with an issue was defined in 
terms of an operation. Specifically, Sherif, Sherif and Nebergall 
(1965) operationally defined involvement as high when the latitude of 
rejection is large relative to the latitude of acceptance, with a 
small, or no, latitude of noncommital. Clarke and Stewart (1971) 
challenged this definition by offering data suggesting that individual 
traits may be a better explanation for width of latitudes of rejection 
than involvement. That is, people with wide latitudes of rejection on 
one topic will tend to have wide latitudes of rejection on most topics. 
After comparing four potential measures of involvement, they conclude, 
"it appears that neither the centrality of the belief to the individ¬ 
ual's self identity nor to his total belief structure is an important 
determinant of the latitude of rejection" (pg 234). 
Other methods of operationalizing involvement are common. 
Wright (1973) manipulated involvement by telling subjects "that they 
could expect to make a short-run decision about the product appearing 
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in the impending advertisement. The relevance of this decision in 
terms of their families, their own time and effort, and their per¬ 
sonal finances was emphasized" (pg 56). Johnson and Scileppi (1969) 
attempted a similar manipulation by telling subjects whether or not 
the experiment they were involved in was very important. Neither of 
these operational definitions are tapping something internal to the 
subjects as they perceive the communication topic. It seems clear 
that Wright was actually influencing attention, while Johnson and 
Scileppi may have been influencing involvement with the experimental 
situation and not with the topic of the message. 
Other researchers have not been as careless and have attempted 
to tap a variable internal to subjects that is expected to inhibit 
acceptance of messages advocating a counterattitudinal position. For 
example. Day (1974) defined highly involved consumers as those who 
were extremely or very interested in differences between brands of 
products. Hupfer and Gardner (1971) measured the importance of issues 
to define involvement. Finally, Rule and Renner (1968) used a com¬ 
bination of attitudinal position and the subjects' confidence that the 
position would not change over a period of time. Although these 
different measures may be tapping different constructs, they do share 
one assumption; namely, that involvement is an attribute of the 
subjects. Topics, issues, or products are not involving per se. 
Involvement varies from buyer to buyer within product classes. 
Therefore, any measure of involvement must tap a dimension internal 
to the buyer. 
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Unresolved Research Problems 
From the literature review, it is evident that comnunication 
researchers may have been missing an important idea. Namely, that 
trust and competence, two recognized dimensions of source credibility, 
may have differential effects on message acceptance. 
Of particular interest to the field of marketing is the fact 
that the source of an advertising message is not limited to the manu¬ 
facturer. Webster (1971) states that there are five sources that a 
receiver can evaluate in marketing communications; the company itself, 
salesmen, resellers, mass media, and hired spokesmen. Suprisingly 
little research has been published on the effects of varying spokesman 
credibility. This is true because it has been assumed that advertising 
is inherently low in trust. Unfortunately, this is more of a dcotrine 
than an empirically verified possibility. 
Fuchs (1964) investigated the credibility effects of the company 
and the vehicle. Kover and Lieberman (1961) attempted to identify the 
characteristics of commercial spokesmen that resulted in the audience 
"liking" them. Their assumption was that a "liked" spokesman will be 
more effective than a spokesman who is less liked. Levitt (1967) found 
that company reputation interacted with characteristics of a salesman. 
Fry and McDougall (1974) found that reseller credibility affects the 
consumer's belief strength that an advertised price is correct. 
Finally, Kanungo and Pang (1973) demonstrated that the sex of a 
spokesman affects the quality ratings potential buyers give to brands 
on salient attributes. To date, no research has been reported that 
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studies the effect of different levels of spokesman credibility in 
advertising. 
Although advertisers have traditionally varied spokesmen in 
advertising messages on dimensions of expertness, similarity, or 
honesty, the choices have been based more on logic derived from findings 
of laboratory studies in social psychology and communications research 
than on empirical work in advertising. 
These revelations, together with the results of the literature 
review, suggest at least three areas where further research is needed. 
First, is it true that advertisements are inherently untrustworthy and 
contaminate the potential trustworthiness of spokesmen? 
Second, as Kelman (1961) and Bauer (1967) have pointed out, the 
effectiveness of different dimensions of source credibility depends 
upon the needs of the receiver. The receiver is an active participant 
in the communication process. Is it possible to identify specific 
receiver variables that facilitate or inhibit this process under 
different source conditions? 
Table 1 has led us to a tentative hypothesis that variations in 
source trust result in differences in message acceptance under most 
receiver conditions, but variations in competence are only successful 
when no other facilitator or inhibitor is operating. A common receiver 
variable in the marketing literature is the buyer's involvement with 
product choice. Involvement may act as an inhibitor of message ac¬ 
ceptance. The third area where research is needed, therefore, is in 
the relation between spokesman trust/competence and buyer involvement. 
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Summary 
In this chapter it was suggested that communication researchers 
may have been missing a very important point with regards to research 
into the effects of credibility. Although it has been long recognized 
that credibility is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, researchers have 
failed to suspect that the dimensions may have different effects. 
Early in the chapter, it was pointed out that source trust and 
source competence are the most stable dimensions of credibility. 
Later, several studies were reviewed which, at first glance, appeared 
to emphasize the futility of searching for generalizable conclusions 
regarding source effects. When separated according to whether they 
varied either source trust or source competence, however, a pattern 
of source effects became evident. Table 1 was used to establish this 
pattern. 
The pattern suggested that differences in competence have dif¬ 
ferential effects on the dependent variable only when no other message 
facilitator or inhibitor was present. Differences in source trust, on 
the other hand, were always effective. No explanation for this 
phenomenon has yet been offered. Several potential facilitators and 
inhibitors were identified, and receiver involvement with brand choice 
was chosen as most relevant to marketing problems. 
After a brief statement about definitional problems with the 
involvement construct, several unresolved research problems were 
identified. 
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CHAPTER II 
RESEARCH PROBLEMS AND DESIGN 
From the set of unresolved research problems identified at the 
end of Chapter I, the relation between spokesman trust/competence 
and buyer involvement was chosen for study. 
The Change Process 
It was argued at the beginning of Chapter I that multi-attribute 
attitude models furnish a valuable starting point for a marketing 
manager's advertising decisions. Specifically, it was stated that by 
revealing the structure of brand attitudes, these models suggest ways 
of creating attitude change. This section will introduce one particular 
multi-attribute attitude model preceded by an explanation of how it 
relates to the basic model of the communication process (Figure 1). 
Then a theory of belief change adapted from Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) 
will be presented. This theory will help explain the results of Table 1. 
Attitude structure 
Multi-attribute attitude models hold that a person's attitude 
toward a brand is based on his salient beliefs about that brand. These 
beliefs link that brand to some attributes and represent the information 
he has about that brand. They can be held with different strengths. 
For example, buyer A may believe very strongly that Pi els beer tastes 
terrible, while buyer B may think it tastes terrible, but is not too 
sure. In this case, buyer A is said to have a stronger belief linking 
the attribute (tastes terrible) to the brand than buyer B. Buyers, 
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then, may differ in terms of the perceived likelihood that a brand 
has the attribute in question. Belief strength is a subjective 
probability that the brand has a particular attribute. 
Since beliefs represent the information a buyer has about a 
brand, and since attitude toward a brand is based on these beliefs, 
it follows that attitudes are formed and changed as a result of new 
information. 
New information can be acquired in either of two ways. First, 
a buyer can acquire information from the product itself. That is, 
he can try it and discover, through use, what physical attributes the 
brand does or does not have. Second, a buyer can acquire information 
from others. That is, he can hear about the attributes of a brand from 
friends; he can hear or read advertisements; he can talk to salesmen; 
or he can read the label. The effects of information acquired in the 
latter fashion can be studied in terms of the basic model of the 
communication process presented in Chapter I. Each of these "others" 
from which the buyer gathers information can be studied as a different 
source of information. How strongly the potential buyer believes the 
information can be studied as a destination variable, or effect, of the 
communication. 
It is assumed that the strengths of the beliefs formed under 
these different information sources will vary. A buyer is likely to 
believe more strongly in his own judgments than in the judgments of 
others. Similarly, information from trusted, knowledgeable friends 
will probably result in stronger beliefs than information from com- 
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mercial sources. These differential effects on belief strength will, 
of course, lead to differential effects on attitude toward the brand. 
According to one popular multi-attribute attitude model (Fish- 
bein and Ajzen, 1975), salient beliefs about a brand combine with the 
buyer's evaluation of the salient attributes in the following fashion: 
N 
(1) A. = e b - • .e- 
J i=l 
where; A. is the buyer's attitude toward brand j, 
J 
b.. is the buyer's belief that brand j possesses attribute i, 
■ J 
e. is the buyer's evaluation of attribute i, and 
N is the number of salient beliefs concerning that brand. 
One obvious way to influence an attitude is to change the beliefs 
about the brand (the b-.'s). A marketing manager's task would be to 
identify the salient attributes of his target market and to implement 
a communications strategy designed to influence buyers' beliefs about 
these attributes as they relate to his brand. 
It is a well recognized fact that different buyers desire 
different attributes for the same product class. These differences 
in buyer wants are one of the bases for market segmentation. They are 
also the bases for different attitudes toward a given brand. 
Suppose the product is toothpaste. One segment of buyers may 
desire whitening ability and "sex appeal" in toothpastes. Another 
segment may desire cavity prevention and flavor. These different 
groups will form their attitudes toward different brands in different 
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ways. That is, the first group evaluates brands of toothpaste on the 
basis of two salient attributes -- whitening ability and "sex appeal". 
In terms of equation (1), N=2. The second group also evaluates brands 
of toothpaste on the basis of two salient attributes. The attributes, 
however, are different. 
If an advertising message extols the virtues of brand A tooth¬ 
paste in terms of its low price and handy dispenser, we would expect 
no influence on the attitude of either group, even though their belief 
strengths linking the brand to these attributes (low price and handy 
dispenser) may be significantly influenced. 
Alternatively, an advertisement may praise brand A for its 
superior whitening ability and "sex appeal". In this case, only the 
attitude of the first group should be affected, even though both 
groups may believe strongly that brand A has superior whitening ability 
and "sex appeal". 
Given the limitations in time and resources for this research, it 
would be exceedingly difficult to segment the subject population on 
the basis of salient attributes desired. Even if this were feasible, 
successful segmentation would require at least two different advertis¬ 
ing messages and two different research arrangements. For these 
reasons, this research will be concerned mainly with belief change 
with the understanding that successful belief change will lead to the 
desired attitude change only for those subjects who have salient 
beliefs related to those in the message. 
The process of belief change 
An advertising message can be thought of as a series of belief 
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statements made by a source linking the brand to some attributes. 
The receiver perceives the source to hold these beliefs with some 
strength. These perceived belief strengths will be called source 
beliefs. 
Before exposure to the product message, a buyer may have some 
beliefs corresponding to the source beliefs in the message. These 
pre-exposure beliefs will be called proximal beliefs. One way for 
an advertisement to succeed in changing a buyer's attitude toward a 
brand is by first changing these proximal beliefs. 
The amount of change which occurs in a proximal belief as a 
result of an advertisement depends upon three things: (1) the degree 
of acceptance of the source belief, (2) the size of the discrepancy 
between the proximal and source belief strengths,^ and (3) the overall 
level of facilitation resulting from source, message, channel and 
audience factors. 
The stronger the acceptance of the source belief, the greater 
the likelihood of change, as long as there is a discrepancy between 
source and proximal beliefs. That is, even though a belief state¬ 
ment in a message may be completely accepted, no change will result 
if the receiver already agrees with it. Change in the direction of 
the communication can only occur if there is some discrepancy 
between source and proximal belief strengths. The larger the 
^Remember that beliefs are defined as "subjective probabilities" 
and will always be held with a strength between zero and one. This is 
true of both source and proximal beliefs. The discrepancy between 
them will, then, always be between zero and one. 
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discrepancy, the more room there is for change. 
The more discrepant a source belief is from the receiver's 
position, however, the greater the likelihood that it will fall into 
his latitude of rejection. This suggests that the larger the dis¬ 
crepancy, the lower the probability that the message will be accepted. 
This inverse relationship between probability of acceptance and dis¬ 
crepancy is subject to influence from message facilitators. For 
example, if the receiver perceives the source as very competent, or 
if the receiver is under stress or fear, message acceptance may be 
facilitated. As this kind of facilitation increases, the probability 
of acceptance should increase as long as the discrepancy is not 
extreme. 
Fisbein and Ajzen (1975) offer the following tentative relations: 
(2) C = P(a) - D 
(3) P(a)=(l-D)1/f 
where; C is the amount of change in the direction of the source 
belief, 
P(a) is the probability of completely accepting the source 
be!ief, 
D is the discrepancy between proximal and source belief 
strengths, and 
f is the overall leyel of facilitation. 
Two things are immediately apparent from these relations. First, 
if there is no discrepancy between source and proximal belief strength, 
the source belief is completely accepted, but no change is expected in 
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2 
the proximal belief. Second, under conditions of very high facili¬ 
tation, any increase in this level will lead to a very small change 
in the probability of acceptance, resulting in very little, if any, 
3 
difference in amounts of change with or without the added facilitation. 
Competence as a facilitator of message acceptance. Equations (2) 
and (3) reveal that if "credibility" is a facilitator of message accep¬ 
tance, manipulations of source credibility are expected to lead to 
changes in proximal beliefs only when there is discrepancy between 
source and proximal belief strengths and when the initial level of fa¬ 
cilitation is low enough for any change to be measurable. Inspection of 
the credibility literature revealed that this is not always the case.^ 
Even in the presence of other facilitators (e.g., stress or fear), 
increasing "credibility" sometimes led to change. When we separated 
studies on the basis of at least two credibility dimensions, on the 
other hand (Table 1), a pattern emerged. It now appears that the 
competence dimension does behave as a facilitator, in that the presence 
2D = 0, P(a) = (l-0)1/f=l, and C * P(a).D = 1-0 = 0. 
3 
Remember that "D" is always between zero and one. If "f is 
large, P(a) will change very little with further increases (under any 
given "D") and have no effect on "C". Changes in "D" will, however, 
be noticed under any given level of "f". 
^It must be pointed out that the dependent variables in most of 
the studies in Tables 1 and 3 were not proximal beliefs. However, 
it can be assumed in most cases related to belief statements contained 
in the message that changes in proximal beliefs would be reflected in 
it. 
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of other facilitators negates its effect. Trust does not act like a 
facilitator. The presence of other facilitators does not negate the 
effect of different levels of trust. In terms of equation (3), it 
may enter the persuasion process through the discrepancy variable. 
Involvement and trust as influences of discrepancy. According 
to social judgment theory (Sherif and Hovland, 1961; Sherif, Sherif and 
Nebergall, 1965), highly involved subjects have a large latitude of 
rejection relative to the size of the latitude of acceptance, and a 
small latitude of noncommitment. Low involved subjects have a small 
latitude of rejection and a large latitude of noncommitment. If a 
communication advocates a position which lies in the latitude of 
rejection, the receiver will tend to perceive the message position 
as being further away from his own than it actually is. This "con¬ 
trast effect" results in increasing the perceived discrepancy between 
proximal and source beliefs. 
Since high involvement results in large latitudes of rejection, 
any counterattitudinal message has a higher probability of falling 
into the latitude of rejection of a highly involved than a non-involved 
receiver. It follows from this that receiver involvement will have its 
greatest impact on the discrepancy mediator in equations (2) and (3). 
High levels of receiver involvement will result in large discrepancy 
levels and low probability of acceptance. 
Source trust may also enter the persuasion process through the 
discrepancy variable. It is hard to completely divorce the dimensions 
of trust and competence, since a totally incompetent communicator 
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tfj'rg tc cc-.e;. 2- a-**a of competence ahout the topic of the com- 
TTu-icav'o" ' r<£ seer as deceptive for this reason alone. Within 
Cr-ta”' ~s o~ cr~retence, however, it is reasonable to assume that 
ss-rce trust 'n* uences the potential contrast effect of a particular 
*«cev»e-. ’mat is, ** a communication falls into the latitude of re- 
jectior, it wi” oe very easy to contrast the perceived position of 
*"= message tie source is seen as being very dishonest anyway. 
Alternative’;/, i* tie receiver perceives the source as being very 
Tcnest ant trustwc^th;, in his presentation, it will be more difficult 
to r^sperceive his actual position an<) contrast it further from the 
receiver's own. Tne result is that low trust sources will result in 
greater discrepancy than high trust sources, particularly under highly 
involving conditions. 
Tnis dissertation does not attempt to test this argument in terms 
of the discrepancy between source and proximal belief strength, but 
tnese assumptions are central to the development of hypotheses to be 
offered concerning the differential effects of source competence and 
source trust under different levels of involvement with brand choice. 
Some further definitions 
It is evident from the above that one possible way to influence 
a buyer's attitude toward a giyen brand is by influencing his beliefs 
linking the brand to salient attributes. This can be accomplished 
through advertising in one of two ways. First, the advertisement can 
contain source beliefs related directly to the salient beliefs we are 
trying to Influence. For example, if we wish to increase the buyer’s 
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belief strength that brand X is durable, we can tell him that "brand 
X is durable". In this case, the proximal belief corresponding to the 
source belief in the message is salient and the target of the com¬ 
munication. 
Second, we can rely on impact effects of source beliefs in the 
advertisement. That is, instead of giving a direct statement about 
the attribute in question, we can present source beliefs that are 
expected to be related to the salient belief. For example, in a 
different attempt to increase the buyer's belief strength that brand 
X is durable, we may avoid the direct statement that "brand X is 
durable", and instead present evidence like "Mrs. Jones had one for 
twenty-five years without ever getting it repaired." The target belief 
in this case is the same as in the previous example — brand X is 
durable. In order to successfully influence the target belief, the 
message must first succeed in influencing the buyer's proximal belief 
corresponding to the source belief of the advertisement ("Mrs. Jones 
..."). If this proximal belief is not influenced, no impact effects 
on the target belief can be expected. 
Research Problem and Objectives 
The objective of this dissertation is to study the differential 
effects of advertising spokesmen's trust and competence as they 
interact with degree of involvement with brand choice. The specific 
destination variables to be studied will be buyers' beliefs that the 
brand in question possesses the attributes credited to it in an 
advertising message. It was argued above that we cannot always expect 
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changes in beliefs to lead to changes in attitude because of the 
presence of various market segments within the subject population, 
but the unstated, untested, managerial goal is to influence attitudes 
toward purchasing and using the brand. 
The research problem is to design a study that investigates the 
differential effects of advertising spokesmen's trust and competence 
on receivers' beliefs in interaction with buyer involvement with brand 
choice. 
Hypotheses 
The assumptions of this study are that involvement with brand 
choice in a product category and perceived trustworthiness of the 
spokesman have opposits impacts on discrepancy and that spokesman 
competence acts as a facilitator of message acceptance. 
Hypothesis 1 
(a) In advertisements directed at subjects who are 
involved with brand choice in the product category, 
change in beliefs that the brand possesses the stated 
attributes will be the same for low competence 
spokesmen as for high competence spokesmen. 
(b) In advertisements directed at subjects who are not 
involved with brand choice in the produce category, 
there wil1 be more favorable belief change due to the 
influence of a high competence spokesman than a low 
competence spokesman. 
Hypothesis 2 
A spokesman perceived to be high in trust will have 
a more favorable impact on beliefs than a spokesman 
low in trust regardless of the level of involvement 
with brand choice. 
Hypotheses la and lb follow from the argument that highly involved 
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receivers will contrast the position of counterattitudinal messages. 
This results in very large discrepancies, and even large increases in 
facilitation (i.e., increased competence) will result in no noticeable 
increase in probability of acceptance. Non-involved receivers will 
not demonstrate this contrast effect and discrepancy will be small 
enough for changes in the level of competence to be noticeable. 
Research Design 
To maximize the differences in trust, competence, and involvement, 
two levels of each will be used -- high and low. The resulting re¬ 
search design to test the hypotheses will be the 2X2X2 factorial 
design with two levels each of trust, competence, and involvement. 
This allows a test of the main effects of all three expected message 
influencers (source trust, source competence, and receiver involvement) 
as well as their interactions. Although hypotheses have not been of¬ 
fered concerning all main effects and interactions, investigation of 
them may prove enlightening for future research. This design will be 
usable, however, only if it is possible to find some subjects who are 
involved with brand choice in a particular product category and others 
who are not involved with brand choice in the same product class. This 
situation will permit the use of one advertising message. 
The dependent variables for all hypotheses are changes in beliefs 
about the likelihood that the brand possesses the attributes credited 
to it in the advertisement. Post-exposure belief strengths will be 
compared to the belief strengths of a non-exposed control group to 
compute change. 
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Even though the advertisement will be about a "new" brand, it 
is expected that buyers have preconceived notions about the likelihood 
that any new brand has certain attributes. It is these pre-exposure 
beliefs that will be used to measure change due to the advertisement. 
Summary 
In Chapter II the problem of major concern was described. First, 
an explanation of attitude structure was offered. It was pointed 
out that belief change can result in attitude change if the beliefs 
are salient in the formation of the attitude. Next, a theory of the 
change process was briefly described and used to explain Table 1 from 
Chapter I. After a statement of the research objective, this explana¬ 
tion was expanded into research hypotheses. 
Finally, the experimental design was described. In order to hold 
the effects of the advertising message itself constant, it will be 
necessary to use only one message. Two levels each of source trust, 
source competence, and receiver involvement were suggested in a 2 X 2 
X 2 factorial design. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH PROCEDURES 
This chapter is concerned with the details of the research 
activities, namely, the selection of the experimental product and 
spokesmen, the pre-testing of experimental instructions and advertising 
message, the acquisition of subjects, and finally, the collection of 
the data. 
Selection of Product 
For practical reasons, it was decided to use under-graduates 
at the University of Massachusetts/Amherst, as subjects. The follow¬ 
ing considerations guided the choice of the experimental product. 
1. Subjects should have use experience with the product, or 
otherwise be familiar with it. They should be the ones to 
make purchase decisions for the product. 
2. Many subjects should be involved with brand choice in the 
product category and be very interested in differences 
among brands. About an equal number of subjects should 
feel that brand choice in this product class is very trivial 
and non-involving. This requirement was necessary in order 
to use the experimental design suggested in Chapter II. If 
one product could be identified with which some subjects 
were involved and some subjects non-involved, then one 
advertising message could be used. This would eliminate 
any differential effects on beliefs due to the message. 
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That is, the message effect could be held constant. 
The difficulties inherent in operationalizing the 
involvement construct were discussed in Chapter I, where 
it was stated that any measure of involvement must tap 
something internal to the respondent. Additionally, it 
has been suggested by many writers that buyers who are 
involved with product choice will tend to be brand loyal, 
and that attitudes based on this involvement will be resis¬ 
tant to change (Engel, Kollat and Blackwell, 1973; Day, 
1974). Therefore, the product for this research must 
elicit these feelings in the subject population. 
With these things in mind, seventy students enrolled in Marketing 
210 during the Fall 1975 semester at the University of Massachusetts/ 
Amherst were asked to suggest both highly involving products and non¬ 
involving products. If they felt that a typical University of Massa¬ 
chusetts student would tend to be strongly committed to a brand and 
be very interested in differences among brands in a particular product 
class, they listed that as a highly involving product. 
Alternatively, if they felt that a typical University of Massa¬ 
chusetts student would tend to be uncommitted to a brand and not be 
interested in differences among brands in a particular product class, 
they listed that as a non-involving product. The answers to these 
projective-type questions were analyzed to identify a product class 
that appeared equally in both categories. The reasoning for this 
analysis is that products so identified will be involving to many 
students and non-involving to many others. 
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Three product classes were identified by this analysis; tooth¬ 
paste, shampoo, and bar soap. To limit this list to one product class, 
sixty-seven students in two different sections of Marketing 210 were 
asked to fill out questionnaire #1 in Appendix A. Twenty-three 
students answered the questionnaire on the product class shampoo. 
Toothpaste and bar soap had twenty-three respondents respectively. 
The interest question is taken from Day (1974) as an operational 
definition of involvement and was to be used as one measure of in¬ 
volvement in the final experiment. 
The results of this questionnaire indicated that toothpaste is a 
product class which elicited a relatively uniform distribution of 
answers to the interest question. Specifically, seven students in- 
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dicated that they were either "extremely" or "very" interested in 
differences among brands of toothpaste, seven students were "somewhat" 
interested, and eight students were "slightly" or "not at all" in¬ 
terested. The results for the other product classes are reproduced 
in Table 4. On the basis of these results, the product class Tooth¬ 
paste was chosen for the final experiment. Involved subjects would be 
those indicating that they were either "extremely" or "very" interested 
in differences among brands of toothpaste. Non-involved subjects would 
be operationally defined as those being "slightly" or "not at all" 
interested in differences among brands of toothpaste. 
Selection of Advertising Spokesmen 
Communicator credibility is not an inherent characteristic of 
the source. Credibility is, so to speak, "in the eyes of the beholder". 
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TABLE 4 
NUMBER OF STUDENTS RESPONDING AT EACH LEVEL 
OF INTEREST TO THE QUESTION, "HOW INTERESTED 
ARE YOU IN DIFFERENCES AMONG BRANDS OF ?" 
ELxtrenely Interested 
Toothpaste 
2 
Bar Soap 
2 
Shampoo 
0 
Very Interested 6 5 3 
Somewhat Interested 8 7 12 
Slightly Interested 5 7 8 
Not at all Interested 2 1 0 
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Therefore, spokesmen chosen as high or low in trust or competence must 
be so identified by the subjects. A search was undertaken to identify 
four toothpaste spokesmen, one each perceived by the subjects as high 
trust, high competence; high trust, low competence; low trust, high 
competence; and low trust, low competence. 
One hundred and eighty-six students enrolled in upper division 
undergraduate marketing courses in the Spring of 1976 were given a 
questionniare designed, in part, to elicit names of product spokes¬ 
men in each of the four categories. Each student was given one 
hypothetical advertising situation and asked to name or otherwise 
describe the spokesman in that situation. There were four different 
hypothetical situations. The four versions of the questionnaire are 
reproduced as questionnaires #2, #3, #4, and #5 in Appendix A. 
Questionnaire #2 describes a high competent, high trust spokesman. 
The high competent, low trust communicator is described in question¬ 
naire #3. Low competence, high trust and low competence, low trust 
are described in questionnaires #4 and #5 respectively. 
The questionnaires specifically stated that the feelings of 
relative trust and competence were elicited by the name of the produce 
spokesman alone. The reason for this description was that in the final 
experiment there would be no actual television conmercial. Any 
evaluations of trust or competence would have to be a result of the 
spokesman and the message. No visual cues would be available. 
It was hoped that there would be reasonable consensus among 
students concerning who was or was not a competent or trustworthy 
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spokesman for toothpaste. This proved to be a false hope. Many 
similar na-es ar>c descriptions were mentioned by the students, but 
they fell into a*' categories of trust and competence. This even¬ 
tuality had been anticipated, however, and the next step in choosing 
a spokesman began. 
IT'mansions of spo<esnar credibility 
In the Fa',', of 1975, forty-seven students enrolled in two 
sections o^ introductory Marketing had been asked to answer a question¬ 
naire designed to elicit *ords used by students to describe product 
spokesmen. The questionnaire is reproduced as questionnaire ?6 in 
Appendix A. Tr.e answers were analyzed to identify the most frequently 
■rationed non-vis-al craracteristics of product spokesmen. These bi¬ 
polar characteristics were used as the basis for another questionnaire 
in which trey were end points of seven-interval bi-polar rating scales. 
Forty-seven sets of adjectives were so identified. 
Fron the voluminous list of suggested spokesmen arrived at 
above, a snorter list of potential spokesmen was generated using those 
that were sonewrat consistent on at least one of the dimensions. 
Taole 5 contains this list of sixteen spokesmen. Each of these 
sixteen spokesmen was tren rated as a spokesman in a toothpaste 
advertisement on tne 47 oi-polar adjectives by students enrolled in 
undergraduate courses in tne Department of Communications Studies, 
University of Massachusetts/Amherst. The reasoning for this procedure 
follows. 
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TABLE 5 
LIST OF SUGGESTED SPOKESMEN TO BE FURTHER TESTED 
1. A dentist who is a member of the board of the American Dental 
Association. (Later identified as Dr. William James.) 
2. Psychologist, Dr. Joyce Brothers. 
3. A dentist. (Later identified as Dr. John Hunt, a Cleveland, 
Ohio, dentist.) 
4. Actor, Robert Young. 
5. A researcher for some federal regulating agency. (Later 
identified as Dr. Robert Davis, a chemist for the FDA.) 
6. Football quarterback, Joe Namath. 
7. Mark Spitz. 
8. Johnny Carson. 
9. Bobby Riggs. 
10. Bill Cosby. 
11. Bob Hope. 
12. An average housewife. (Later identified as Mrs. Ann Howard, 
hosewife and mother.) 
13. Ed McMahon. 
14. Mario Thomas. 
15. A person who developed the toothpaste for the company selling 
it. (Later identified as Dr. John Crosby, a Lever Brothers 
chemist.) 
16. Carol Burnett. 
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In Chapter I, it was pointed out that factor analysis has been 
one of the most popular methods of discovering the dimensions of 
source credibility. Some of the researchers using this technique 
have developed the scales from a unique subject population, based 
on a specific concept (e.g., "news broadcasters" or "college teachers"). 
Others have used scales developed by earlier researchers and have 
applied them to different subjects, measuring different concepts. 
This is a common practice, especially in conducting manipulation checks 
in credibility research. For example, a researcher will attribute a 
message to different sources, believed by him to vary in "credibility". 
As part of his experiment he will have subjects rate the source on 
scales borrowed from earlier factor analysis research. If the sources 
differ on these scales, he will consider his manipulation successful 
and proceed to the results. 
Tucker (1971a, 1971b) has warned against this practice of bor¬ 
rowing others' scales. The danger exists that scales developed for 
one concept with one subject pool may not apply to other concepts and/ 
or other subjects. In discussing the problem of reliability, Tucker 
concludes that "the burden of demonstrating that the measuring in¬ 
struments employed in a given experiment are logically adequate rests 
with the researcher" (1971b, pg 186). 
The purposes of this pre-test were to develop bl-polar adjective 
scales from subjects drawn from the same pool as those in the final 
experiment (University of Massachusetts undergraduates), and to 
demonstrate that the result of a factor analysis performed on them was 
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a function of the concept to be used in the final experiment (advertis¬ 
ing spokesmen for toothpaste). 
Four hundred and ninety-four undergraduate students enrolled in 
the Department of Communications Studies, University of Massachusetts/ 
Amherst, rated the spokesmen. Each respondent rated four different 
spokesmen. The page within a questionnaire that each spokesman ap¬ 
peared on was systematically varied so that each spokesman was rated 
1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th on equal number of times. A description of the 
questionnaire appears as questionnaire #7 in Appendix A. The fre¬ 
quency of spokesman by page is reported in Table 6. 
Fifteen of the spokesmen were rated "in an advertisement for 
toothpaste". The Lever Brothers chemist was rated "in an advertisement 
for a Lever Brothers brand of toothpaste". It was felt that the 
particular manufacture would not influence ratings of the other 
fifteen spokesmen, but that ratings of the Lever Brothers chemist 
would depend on whether or not it was "his own" brand. 
These scores were subjected to a factor analysis using the 
principle factors technique followed by an orthogonal rotation to 
simple structure with the varimax criterion. Eigenvalues of 1.0 or 
greater was the determining cutoff point for the interpretation of 
rotated factors (arbitrary). Based on the results of the research 
reported in Chapter I, it was expected that factors like trust, com¬ 
petence, and dynamism would be found. If the spokesmen differed 
significantly on these factors, this would suggest that dimensions 
of credibility can be varied in an advertising context. 
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TABLE 6 
NUMBER OF RATINGS PER PAGE ON PRE-TEST QUESTIONNAIRE 
Spokesman 
Page 
Total 
i 2 3 4 
ADA Board member 30 32 31 32 125 
Dr. Joyce Brothers 31 31 30 29 121 
Cleveland dentist 31 30 32 31 124 
Robert Young 30 32 31 31 124 
FDA chemist 32 31 32 31 126 
Joe Namath 29 31 30 32 122 
Mark Spitz 32 31 32 31 126 
Johnny Carson 31 32 31 32 126 
Bobby Riggs 32 31 31 30 124 
Bill Cosby 32 31 31 30 124 
Bob Hope 31 31 30 30 122 
Housewife and mother 30 30 32 31 123 
Ed McMahon 31 30 30 32 123 
Mario Thomas 31 30 29 31 121 
Lever Brothers chemist 30 29 31 30 120 
Carol Burnett 31 32 31 31 125 
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Table 7 contains the results of this factor analysis. Only 
those scales which loaded heavily (.7 or better on one factor) and 
purely (less than .4 on all other factors) were selected as reflective 
of a particular factor. These cutoff points were arbitrarily chosen. 
The adjectives in Table 7 are the right side of the bi-polar pairs 
in questionnaire #7 in Appendix A. 
Trustworthy, honest, reliable, fair, truthful, and helpful load 
most heavily on factor 1. This is consistent with other research 
and suggests that toothpaste spokesmen are evaluated on a trust 
dimension and that these adjectives tap this dimension. 
Trained, experienced, qualified, and professional load most 
heavily on factor 2. This is a competence-type dimension, and it too 
is consistent with other research. 
Factor three appears to be a "charisma" dimension and is unique 
to this concept. Factor four is the "dynamism" dimension common to 
other studies. 
The first step in a search for spokesmen to use in this research 
established that the dimensions of trust and competence do exist for 
this concept, and provided us with scales to use in measuring dif¬ 
ferences along these dimensions. The next step was to find spokesmen 
who so differed. 
Differences in spokesman trust and competence 
In order to see if the sixteen spokesmen differed on the 
dimensions of trust and competence, a score was computed for each 
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TABLE 7 
FACTOR LOADINGS AFTER FACTOR ANALYSIS ON ALL 16 PRE-TEST SPOKESMEN 
MINDED .52014 .06932 .29367 .06023 
BOLD -.05432 .04816 .21391 .63135 
ENTHSTC .15340 .13808 .51649 .39634 
ATTRCTVE .10174 -.02321 .68764 .07784 
FRIENDLY .13205 -.02901 .73825 .19954 
CONCERNED .50966 .39525 .02934 -.11609 
KNOWLEDGEABLE .42274 .65179 -.13574 -.09313 
ABLE .38632 .66797 .10555 .04750 
TRUSTWORTHY .74467 .28061 .12047 -.01834 
ENTERTAINING .04016 -.00251 .75237 .36740 
SINCERE .68337 .25134 .23136 -.02447 
WARM .30692 .04430 .65503 .11481 
APPROPRIATE .45362 .51998 .07788 -.07737 
FRANK .39275 .24547 .02591 .29093 
SKILLED .28958 .78480 -.00377 .07356 
REASONABLE .58430 .39503 .13885 .03829 
INTERESTING .18880 .10121 .69274 .32959 
HONEST .78578 .19772 .10450 .00116 
IMPORTANT .51363 .43061 .12180 .12080 
KIND .40800 .01136 .48551 .09150 
EXTROVERTED -.08805 -.06867 .37798 .65445 
RELIABLE .73663 .38193 .03723 .02807 
ACTIVE .06750 .09454 .37624 .64156 
FAIR .76044 .16916 .12996 .07915 
TRUTHFUL .82797 .23408 .07080 .00563 
ENERGETIC .06012 .00719 .50570 .58197 
FAMILIAR .02682 -.06273 .46590 .39036 
HELPFUL .70363 .32067 .10330 .07898 
SAFE .66865 .27333 .03907 .07466 
RELEVANT .59022 .45595 -.03652 -.04758 
ALOOF -.13116 .01154 -.27646 -.09397 
APPEALING .24450 .07793 .75978 .16253 
INFORMED .49081 .65152 -.08953 -.01786 
BELIEVABLE .68637 .46000 .12029 -.00880 
UNSELFISH .61571 .11593 .21670 .01147 
JUST .69553 .23872 .07974 .05176 
TRAINED .20247 .81683 -.02574 .06331 
CASUAL -.04596 -.22071 .46379 .36867 
EMPHATIC .15148 .20183 .14322 .54639 
AGGRESSIVE -.08485 .02881 .17207 .77777 
SURE .25673 .47101 .00993 .47092 
INTERESTED .41039 .47101 .11893 .12656 
EXPERIENCED .22658 .82814 -.00750 .10135 
UNBIASED .56188 .08299 .15571 -.01281 
QUALIFIED .37707 .77579 -.07905 -.04788 
PROFESSIONAL .20927 .77941 .02768 .13118 
MOTIVATED .16316 .43295 .09922 .23557 
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spokesman on each dimension for each respondent. This was accom¬ 
plished by first coding the intervals in questionnaire #7 in 
Appendix A from 1 to 7, with the 1 being assigned to the positive 
or high end of each scale. The scores on the six adjectives in 
factor 1 were summed to obtain a score on the Trust dimension. 
Scores were similarly obtained for the Competence dimension. 
These scores were then averaged for each spokesman across all 
respondents. If a respondent had failed to answer a particular 
scale, he was excluded from the computation for the associated 
dimension. The spokesmen were then ranked on each factor. Tables 
8 and 9 contain the results of this ranking. 
T-tests were computed for all possible pairs of spokesmen. 
The brackets in Tables 8 and 9 indicate groups of spokesmen who did 
not significantly differ from each other on the score for that 
dimension (p<.05, one tailed). For example, in Table 8 it is possible 
that Robert Young was perceived to be about as trustworthy in a tooth¬ 
paste advertisement as the Cleveland dentist, but it is unlikely that 
Bill Cosby is comparable in trust to the Cleveland dentist. On the 
other hand, it is also possible that Robert Young and Bill Cosby were 
perceived alike. 
From these scores, it was necessary to choose four spokesmen 
to use in the final experiment. The requirements for selection were 
that there had to be two pairs of spokesmen that differed significantly 
on the trust dimension, while the members of each pair were similar to 
each other in perceived trust. Similarly, there had to be two dif- 
•65 
TABLE 8 
RANKINGS ON TRUST DIMENSION 
Spokesman N 
Cleveland dentist 122 
ADA board member 121 
FDA chemist 123 
Robert Young 120 
Bill Cosby 122 
Carol Burnett 120 
Dr. Joyce Brothers 114 
Housewife and mother 118 
Mario Thomas 117 
Lever Brothers chemist 117 
_Bob Hope 121 
Johnny Carson 121 
Ed McMahon 121 
Mark Spitz 123 
Joe Namath 122 
Bobby Riggs 119 
Mean 
14.53 
14.68 
15.20 
15.88 
16.43 
17.97 
18.69 
20.35 
20.90 
20.94 
21.02 
23.41 
23.45 
23.94 
24.57 
25.63 
The possible range is: 6 - most trustworthy 
42 - least trustworthy 
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TABLE 9 
RANKINGS ON COMPETENCE DIMENSION 
Spokesman N Mean 
ADA board member 122 6.14 
Cleveland dentist 122 6.81 
FDA chemist 125 7.09 
Lever Brothers chemist 117 7.46 
Bill Cosby 121 11.31 
Carol Burnett 123 11.41 
Robert Young 120 11.60 
Bob Hope 119 12.03 
Dr. Joyce Brothers 116 12.36 
Ed McMahon 121 12.74 
Johnny Carson 123 13.46 
Mario Thomas 116 13.68 
Bobby Riggs 121 16.26 
Joe Namath 121 17.41 
Mark Spitz 124 17.72 
Housewife and mother 117 18.21 
The possible range of scores is: 4 - most competent 
28 - least competent 
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ferent pairs of spokesmen that differed on the competence dimension, 
while the members of each pair were similar to each other in perceived 
competence. In other words, referring to Table 10, it was desired 
that the spokesmen in cells 1 and 2 have the same level of perceived 
trust. This level of trust had to be significantly higher than the 
level of perceived trust attributed to the spokesmen in cells 3 and 
4. The spokesmen in cells 1 and 3 should possess the same level of 
perceived competence, higher than the perceived competence of the 
spokesmen in cells 2 and 4. These requirements were desired in order 
to use an analysis of variance procedure with two levels of each 
factor. If these requirements could not be met, it would be necessary 
to use the factors of "generally high" and "generally low" for each 
factor. 
Table 10 represents the only possible set of spokesmen that met 
these criteria. The Cleveland dentist and Robert Young were perceived 
to be equal in trust; the Lever Brothers chemist and Bob Hope were 
also perceived to be equal in trust, but statistically lower in trust 
than the first pair. Furthermore, both Robert Young and Bob Hope were 
perceived to have the same low level of competence compared to the 
high level of competence attributed to the Cleveland dentist and the 
Lever Brothers chemist. 
With Tucker's (1971a, 1971b) warnings in mind, a further test 
was conducted before choosing this set of spokesmen. Although each 
of these spokesmen had been rated in an advertising context, the fact 
that they are different people makes them technically different con- 
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TABLE 10 
FIRST SELECTION OF SPOKESMEN 
High Trust 
Low Trust 
High Competence Low Competence 
cell 1 cell 2 
[6.8l] [11.60] 
Cleveland dentist Robert Young 
(14.53) (15.88) 
cel 1 3 cell 4 
[7.46| [12.03] 
Lever Brothers chemist Bob Hope 
(20.94) (21.02) 
Number in brackets is the average competence rating from Table 9. 
Number in parentheses is the average trust rating from Table 8. 
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cepts. The factor analysis had been performed on the whole set of 
potential spokesmen. It was certainly possible that each spokesman 
was not judged on the resultant factors and/or that the same adjectives 
did not tap these dimensions across spokesmen. 
For these reasons, four further factor analyses were performed — 
one for each of the spokesmen in Table 10. It was discovered that all 
four potential spokesmen were rated on a competence-type dimension, 
measurable with the adjective pairs skilled-unskilled, trained-un¬ 
trained, experienced-inexperienced, and professional-unprofessional. 
A clear trust dimension was present, however, only for three of the 
four potential spokesmen. Bob Hope was the exception. For him, the 
trust-type adjective pairs loaded on the same factor as the adjective 
pairs entertaining-boring, appropriate-inappropriate, important-un¬ 
important, and appealing-unappealing. The results of these factor 
analyses are reported in Appendix B. It was decided that this factor 
was too complex to be called a trust dimension, and Bob Hope was dis¬ 
carded as a potential spokesman for the final experiment. 
Referring back to Tables 8 and 9, it is seen that the spokesman 
ranking next below Bob Hope in trust is Johnny Carson. He also ranks 
lower in competence. Since this cell was to represent a low trust, 
low competence spokesman, Johnny Carson seemed a likely substitute. 
A factor analysis was performed on the concept "Tonight show host 
Johnny Carson in an advertisement for toothpaste" to determine whether 
or not trust and competence factors existed. Both factors emerged and 
could be labeled with confidence. The results are reported in Appendix 
B. 
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This analysis resulted in the choice of the four advertising 
spokesmen to be used in the final experiment. Table 11 is a repre¬ 
sentation of the final spokesmen choice. 
A manipulation check was planned for the final experiment. This 
would consist of having each respondent rate the toothpaste spokesman 
to whom he had been exposed on bi-polar adjective scales that loaded 
most heavily on the trust and competence dimensions. To be sure the 
chosen scales were reliable for the concepts involved (the four chosen 
spokesmen), one fina' factor analysis was performed using those four 
spokesmen together. The result is reported in Appendix B. 
Trustworthy-untrustworthy, honest-dishonest, reliable-un¬ 
reliable, fair-unfair, truthful-deceiving, and helpful-unhelpful were 
chosen to measure differences in perceived spokesman trust. Dif¬ 
ferences in perceived competence would be measured with the adjective 
pairs skilled-unskilled, trained-untrained, experienced-inexperienced, 
and professional-unprofessional. 
Design of Experimental Message and Questionnaire 
Although it was argued in Chapter II that the subject pool was 
probably composed of many different segments of toothpaste users — 
in terms of the attributes desired in toothpastes — it was decided 
to conduct the experiment as if there was only one segment. That is, 
after a marketing manager has measured and defined meaningful market 
segments, he will usually attempt to reach them via different media, 
with different messages. Indeed, in some cases he may even wish to 
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TABLE 11 
FINAL SELECTION OF SPOKESMEN 
High Trust 
Low Trust 
High Competence Low Competence 
Cleveland dentist Robert Young 
Lever Brothers chemist Johnny Carson 
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design different products for different segments. This research trea¬ 
ted the subject population as if they comprised one segment, and one 
advertising message was developed with the managerial intent of in¬ 
fluencing potential buyers' attitudes toward purchasing and using 
the toothpaste brand. The reader is reminded, however, that the 
research goal was to differentially influence the potential buyers' 
beliefs that the brand possessed certain attributes. The reason for 
this difference in managerial and research goals was that we may not 
really have one market segment. A research demonstration that beliefs 
are differentially influenced by differences in spokesman trust and 
competence is expected to result in differential effects on attitudes 
only for those subjects for whom the message beliefs are salient. 
If the managerial intent is to influence attitudes toward pur¬ 
chasing and using a brand through advertising, the multi-attribute 
attitude model developed in Chapter II guides the marketing manager 
in his decisions about what to say concerning the brand. Specifically, 
if he can influence the buyers' proximal belief strengths that the 
brand possesses salient attributes, he should be able to influence 
attitude. First, he must identify the salient beliefs of his target 
market. 
Question #3 in questionnaire #4, Appendix A, was designed to 
elicit the salient attributes of the product category. The attitude 
of interest in this research was the attitude toward purchasing and 
using the brand of toothpaste. Therefore, this question was worded 
in terms of consumption and use and asked students to "list the kinds 
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of things (e.g., product attributes, consequences of using the product, 
etc.) that a typical University of Massachusetts student looks for 
when selecting a brand of toothpaste for her/his own consumption." 
The four or five most frequently mentioned attributes were con¬ 
sidered to be the salient attributes for the subject population. 
This follows Fishbein's and Ajzen's suggestion: 
To ascertain the model salient beliefs 
within a given population, a represen¬ 
tative sample of the population could 
be asked to elicit their beliefs about 
the product; the most frequently elicit¬ 
ed beliefs could be considered the modal 
salient beliefs for the population. (1975, pg 219) 
The frequency count of the answers appears in Table 12. As 
indicated in the table, the attributes can be condensed. The subject 
population desired a toothpaste that prevents cavities through the use 
of fluoride, makes the mouth feel good because of its taste and mouth¬ 
wash effect, cleans and whitens teeth without excessive abrasion, and 
is reasonably priced. 
These desired attributes were used to design an advertising 
message. The message was pre-tested on twenty-four students enrolled 
in one section of an introductory marketing course in Spring 1976. 
These students had not been used previously and would not be used 
again. The message and questionnaire appear in Appendix C, question¬ 
naire #1. 
The purposes of the pre-test were to check the believability of 
the cover story, to get a feeling for the effect of the message, and 
to try different ways of measuring the dependent variables. 
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TABLE 12 
MODAL ATTRIBUTES—TOOTHPASTE3 
Attribute N& 
Attribute #1 
Decay prevention 87 
Fluoride 47 
Attribute #2 
Flavor (good, pleasant, etc.) 15 
Taste 122 
Feel of mouth (after-taste) 16 
Effect on breath (favorable) 32 
Acts as a mouthwash 6 
Attribute #3 
Whitens teeth 84 
Ability to clean teeth 16 
Low abrasion 20 
Price (low or reasonable) 88 
Choice of sizes 13 
Good brand reputation 27 
Form (container, gel, or paste) 7 
aNon-random sample—convenience sample of 187 students enrolled 
in 6 undergraduate marketing sections. 
^Adds up to more than 187 because many students mentioned more 
than one attribute. 
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Cover story 
For this research to be successful, subjects had to believe that 
the message was an actual commercial message. In addition, it was 
desired that all subjects enter the experiment with the same degree 
of familiarity with the advertised brand. For these reasons, it was 
decided to use a hypothetical brand that none of the subjects knew. 
To accomplish this, the cover story about a test market brand named 
VISTA was fabricated. The brand was said to be marketed by Lever 
Brothers because of the decision to use the Lever Brothers chemist as 
one of the spokesmen. It was hoped that the attribution of the in¬ 
formation to professor Paul would enhance the believability of the 
cover story. 
In a short debriefing session after the pre-test, it became ap¬ 
parent that the subjects had accepted the cover story as fact. It was 
kept for use in the final experiment. 
Message 
Analysis of the results of this pre-test posed some interesting 
questions. It became apparent that most subjects expected that any 
new toothpaste would taste good (what reasonable manufacturer would 
produce a toothpaste that tastes bad?), would prevent cavities, and 
would clean teeth. The discovery of these expectations led the 
experimenter to fear that knowledge of the existence of the new brand 
of toothpaste would alone result in strong beliefs that it possessed 
these attributes. If this proved to be the case, we may observe a 
ceiling effect in measuring beliefs and get no observed differences 
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across spokesmen. The message itself was too believable. 
This thinking resulted in changing the experimental message to 
consist of brand superiority claims concerning the salient attributes. 
The statement about the seal of approval was deleted because it was 
felt that this was equivalent to introducing another message source. 
As it was, the source would be both the experimental spokesman and 
the manufacturer. There was no desire to complicate the experiment 
further. The final advertising message appears in questionnaire #2, 
Appendix C. 
Impact effects 
It was explained in Chapter II that statements in a message can 
influence related beliefs. This influence on unstated beliefs was 
labeled an impact effect of the communication. The question at the 
bottom of page 5 of the pre-test questionnaire was used to discover 
any unanticipated impact effects of the message. 
Analysis of the answers revealed that the only probable impact 
effect was the belief on the part of a few subjects that VISTA 
toothpaste may sell for as much as or more than other national brands 
of toothpaste. It was decided to measure this potential impact effect 
in the final questionnaire. 
Measuring the dependent variables 
The dependent variables of interest in this study were beliefs. 
Both beliefs contained in the message and potential impact effects 
would be measured. 
It was stated in Chapter II that beliefs are subjective prob- 
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abilities linking the brand to some attributes. The best way to 
measure beliefs, then, is on a probabilistic scale. Therefore, after 
exposure to the pre-test message, subjects were asked to respond to 
nine different belief statements on a seven interval scale labeled 
"very improbable" to "very probable". The particular questions con¬ 
cerned statements of different brand-attribute links, but were not 
necessarily planned for inclusion in the final questionnaire. They 
were merely attempts at measurement. 
The debriefing period following the questionnaire revealed that 
subjects felt very comfortable with this wording and had no trouble 
in responding as requested. 
The second important element in the attitude model upon which 
this research is based is the evaluation of the salient attributes. 
The attitude toward purchasing and using a brand is the sum of the 
products of be!iefs that the brand possesses attributes that lead to 
certain consequences and evaluations of these consequences. For the 
purposes of future research into the exact structure of the attitude, 
questions were included to measure the subjects' evaluations of the 
consequences of purchasing and using the brand. 
The final questionnaire 
Appendix C, questionnaire #2, is a reproduction of the final 
instrument. An explanation of each page follows. 
Page one. All subjects were exposed to this cover story. De¬ 
briefing questions on the last page indicated that it was believed by 
the subjects. 
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Page two. This page contained the credibility manipulation and 
the message. The message was held constant for all subjects. Approxi¬ 
mately one-fourth of the subjects were exposed to each spokesman intro¬ 
duction. Appendix C explains how these introductions varied. 
Page three. It had been feared that many student subjects might 
simply scan the experimental material before answering the question¬ 
naire. For this reason, page three urged them to become familiar with 
the content of the message. It was hoped that they would also remember 
the commercial spokesman. 
Page four. This page contained the dependent variables of inter¬ 
est for testing the research hypotheses. Before any analysis of 
message effects could be conducted, it was necessary to analyze the 
persuasive message to understand what source beliefs were contained in 
the message. Table 13 lists the identifiable source beliefs in the 
message. 
Some of these source beliefs were not target beliefs of the com¬ 
munication. That is, the managerial desire was to influence salient 
beliefs concerning decay prevention, taste, cleaning ability, abrasion, 
and price. Source beliefs numbered 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8, and potential 
impact effects 10, 13, 14, and 15 in Table 13 are these target beliefs. 
The other source beliefs are specifically mentioned in the message and 
may be related to, and therefore influence, the target beliefs. Poten¬ 
tial impact effects numbered 11 and 12 in Table 13 were measured out 
of curiosity. It was expected that source beliefs would be directly 
affected by differences in spokesmen. Non-source beliefs would be 
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TABLE 13 
_BELIEF STATEMENTS MEASURED IN FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
Source beliefs actually mentioned in message 
1. VISTA toothpaste is new. 
* 
2. VISTA toothpaste is made with a new type of fluoride. 
3. VISTA toothpaste is not just another fluoride toothpaste. 
4. VISTA toothpaste is made by Lever Brothers. 
5. VISTA's fluoride compound prevents cavities better than other 
brands of fluoride toothpaste.* 
6. VISTA toothpaste is lower in abrasives than other brands of 
fluoride toothpaste.* 
7. VISTA toothpaste is higher in whitening ability than other 
brands of fluoride toothpaste.* 
8. Brushing with VISTA makes your mouth feel clean.* 
9. VISTA gives you fresh taste and cleaner teeth without sacri¬ 
ficing decay prevention. 
Potential impact effects--not specifically mentioned in message 
10. VISTA toothpaste tastes good.* 
11. VISTA toothpaste has the seal of approval of the American 
Dental Association. 
12. VISTA toothpaste works like a mouthwash.. 
13. VISTA toothpaste sells at about the same price as other national 
brands of fluoride toothpaste.* 
14. VISTA toothpaste prevents cavities.* 
15. VISTA toothpaste whitens teeth.* 
♦Indicates target belief—a belief that the marketing manager 
hopes to influence based on his analysis of the attitude structure 
of the target market. 
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differentially affected through impact effects only if they were 
related to the source beliefs in the message. 
Subjects were instructed to rate each belief statement on a 
seven interval scale labeled "very improbable" to very probable" 
according to their own beliefs. It was emphasized that this was not 
a quiz concerning the contents of the advertisement. The answers were 
coded from 1 (very improbable) to 7 (very probable). 
Page five. The importance questions on this page were included 
for future research. The researcher hoped that the subjects could be 
later segmented on the basis of desired attributes and a differential 
effect on attitude studied. 
The interest question on this page is the measure of involvement 
in brand choice. This is not the exact question used in the pre-test 
in that the final subjects were offered seven possible gradations of 
interest instead of five. Additionally, the semantic codings of the 
intervals were dropped in favor of unlabeled intervals. 
Page six. This page contained measures of the subjects' evalua¬ 
tions corresponding to each of the sixteen beliefs measured on page 
four. This is the evaluation component of the multi-attribute attitude 
model. They were coded from -3 (bad) to +3 (good). The evaluations 
were measured in terms of purchasing and using any fluoride toothpaste 
that possessed the stated and implied attributes. 
A marketing manager would multiply each evaluation by the belief 
strength of its corresponding attribute and sum these products over 
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all salient beliefs to arrive at an index of potential buyers' 
attitudes toward purchasing and using his brand. 
No hypotheses about the spokesmen's effect on these evaluations 
were offered. They were measured to explore the possibility that this 
component of attitude was affected. 
Page seven. This page contained questions unrelated to the re¬ 
search hypotheses, and the results will be used for future research. 
Page eight. The top part of this page contained the manipulation 
check for the spokesmen. Each subject was asked to rate the spokes¬ 
man to whom he had been exposed on the six bi-polar adjectives that 
had been established as tapping the trust dimension for this concept 
and on the four bi-polar adjectives that tapped the competence di¬ 
mension. Six filler adjective pairs were also included. A random 
number table was used to determine the order of these bi-polar adjec¬ 
tives. 
The bottom part of this page contained a direct measure of 
attitude toward purchasing and using VISTA toothpaste. These are the 
same scales used by Ajzen and Fishbein (1970) to measure an attitude 
toward a behavior. This measure was taken for use in future research. 
Page nine. Subjects were asked what other courses and sections 
they were enrolled in. The purpose of this question was twofold. 
First, any subject that was enrolled in more than one course in which 
this questionnaire was given was to be excluded the second time. 
This did not prove to be necessary since no subject responded twice. 
The second reason for this question was to identify and exclude 
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those subjects enrolled in courses that were involved in the pre¬ 
tests. Two respondents were so identified and excluded. 
The question on brand use and the "agree-disagree" questions 
were included for future research on the definition and understanding 
of involvement. 
The final two questions were debriefing questions. The answers 
to these questions were very encouraging. No respondent came close to 
suspecting that the spokesmen were being varied, and most answers im¬ 
plied that the subjects believed the cover story fully. In fact, 
many respondents indicated that they understood the "researcher" to be 
Market Research Corporation of America, Inc. Those respondents ex¬ 
posed to either Robert Young or Johnny Carson expressed the suspicion 
that the research purpose was to see if that particular spokesman 
was "effective". 
Control group questionnaire 
Even though the student subjects had never heard of VISTA tooth¬ 
paste before this experiment, it was felt that they might have beliefs 
about it based on their prior knowledge of toothpastes in general. 
As mentioned above, the belief that the brand existed was itself 
enough to influence beliefs that it tasted good, would prevent cavities, 
and would clean teeth. That is, even before exposure to an advertising 
message, potential buyers held some beliefs about the brand. A mea¬ 
sure of these pre-exposure beliefs was desired as a base point against 
which to compare the message/spokesman effect. 
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A control group questionnaire was designed that was almost 
identical to the experimental questionnaire. Pages 1 and 3 of the 
experimental questionnaire were combined as the control cover story. 
No advertising message or mention of a spokesman was included. All 
other questions were identical to the experimental questionnaire, ex¬ 
cept the direct measure of attitude toward purchasing and using VISTA. 
Two different ways of asking this question were used in two different 
versions of the control questionnaire. A third version contained no 
attitude measure. This was done for use in future research and the 
results were not analyzed for this dissertation. Copies of the control 
questionnaire are included in Appendix C. 
Acquisition of Subjects and Data Collection 
The hypotheses of this research concern the effect of different 
spokesmen on subjects who are differentially involved with brand choice. 
Involvement was to be operationalized as the degree of interest a sub¬ 
ject has in differences among brands of toothpaste. 
Question #1 in questionnaires 2, 3, 4, and 5, Appendix A, was 
a pre-test of the involvement question to arrive at an estimate of the 
true distribution of answers to this question. Table 14 contains the 
frequencies of answers to this question. 
It had been decided that subjects who were "extremely" or "very" 
interested in differences among brands of toothpaste would be considered 
involved and that those subjects who were "slightly" or "not at all" 
interested would be considered non-involved. From the results of this 
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TABLE 14 
riSTRIBJTlOI. OF ANSWERS '0 THE QUESTION HOW INTERESTED ARE YOU IN 
DIFFERENCES AMONG BRANDS OF TOOTHPASTE?" N=187 
Extrenely irteresiec 3 
Very interested 40 
Somewhat interested 89 
Slightly interested 47 
Hot at all interested 8 
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question, we could expect that approximately 23 percent of the respon¬ 
dents would be defined as involved and that approximately 29 percent 
would be defined as non-involved in the final experiment. Although the 
final questionnaire contained a seven interval interest question, it 
was not expected that these percentages would vary very much. 
It was hoped that random distribution of the questionnaires would 
result in about one-fourth of each of these involvement groups being 
assigned to each of the four spokesman conditions. This reasoning led 
to the expectation that approximately 6 percent of the sampled popula¬ 
tion would be assigned to each spokesman condition as involved. Simi¬ 
larly, approximately 7 percent would be non-involved under each spokes¬ 
man. 
A sample size of 400 respondents, therefore, was expected to 
result in approximately 24-28 usable respondents per cell in the re¬ 
search design. Additionally, the unexposed control group was desired 
since the research was interested in belief change, not merely dif¬ 
ferential final effects of spokesmen. 
Since approximately 600 respondents were available, itwas decided 
to use them all. 
Students enrolled in the six remaining sections of Marketing 201 
that had not been used in the pre-tests, all 12 sections of Management 
201, and 4 large sections of Accounting 120 were chosen as subjects. 
Students enrolled in more than one sampled course were instructed not 
to answer the questionnaire a second time. 
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Each experimental questionnaire contained only one spokesman 
introduction. Questionnaires containing each introduction were al¬ 
ternated in a stack. The experimenter entered each classroom, gave 
a brief explanation that he had some data from a test market and a 
questionnaire designed around it. He asked the subjects to respond 
privately and not to compare answers or discuss the questionnaire 
among themselves. Any questions would be answered personally. There 
were no questions. There was no indication that the subjects sus¬ 
pected that the questionnaire varied according to spokesmen. 
The questionnaires were distributed sequentially from the top of 
the stack. This was considered to be random assignment of spokesman 
conditions to subjects. Subjects would, of course, be self-selected 
into involvement groups. 
This procedure was followed in all 18 sections receiving the ex¬ 
perimental questionnaire. The control group questionnaires were dis¬ 
tributed in 4 different sections. The control group questionnaires 
were much shorter and were printed with a different color ink, and it 
was anticipated that these differences might cause discussion and com¬ 
parison if they were distributed along with the experimental question¬ 
naires. For this reason, it was decided to distribute them in sep¬ 
arate sections. There was no reason to suspect that the students in 
these sections were any different than students in the other sections. 
In the end, 616 questionnaires were collected, including 101 control 
group questionnaires. The data were collected from Monday, April 26, 
1976 to Tuesday, May 4, 1976. 
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Summary 
The detailed activities involved in implementing the research 
plan were described in this chapter. Based on the desired criteria, 
toothpaste was chosen as a product which would elicit feelings of 
involvement or non-involvement for about an equal number of student 
subjects. Involvement was operationalized as extreme or close to 
extreme interest in differences among brands of toothpaste. 
The complex activities necessary for identifying toothpaste 
spokesmen who differed along dimensions of trust and competence was 
described, and the final selection of spokesmen was explained. A 
factor analysis of subject-generated bi-polar adjectives was used to 
define these dimensions and to prepare a manipulation check. 
The various pre-tests of experimental procedures were described, 
and the final experimental instrument was sunmarized. Six hundred and 
sixteen undergraduate students participated in the final experiment. 
The manner in which they were obtained was explained. Data collection 
lasted for seven class days, and the typical experimental session was 
described. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The results of the research are presented in this chapter and 
are organized into three sections: (1) preliminary procedures in¬ 
cluding the calculation of the dependent variable; (2) manipulation 
check; and (3) tests of hypotheses. 
Preliminary Procedures 
Poorly answered questionnaires 
The data were tabulated and checked for any irregularities. 
Three subjects had answered the questionnaire in a highly inconsistent 
manner. For example, the check marks on some pages followed definable 
visual patterns, and other pages were left completely unanswered. 
These three questionnaires were discarded. 
Demand characteristics 
To search for other cases warranting deletion, the responses to 
the debriefing questions were reviewed. As mentioned in Chapter III, 
no subject guessed the true purpose for this questionnaire. There¬ 
fore, no subjects were deleted under the suspicion of possessing 
these demand characteristics. 
Answers to the question that asked if respondents used any par¬ 
ticular pattern or guidelines in answering the questionnaire revealed 
that most subjects did not use patterns or guidelines. The few who 
answered "yes" indicated either that they answered it very carefully 
or that they were thinking of their favorite brand of toothpaste while 
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responding. All of these subjects were retained. 
Two subjects were identified as having been involved in one of 
the pre-tests. These two questionnaires were deleted. Five hundred 
and ten usable experimental questionnaires and one hundred and one 
control group questionnaires were used for the final analysis. 
Computing the dependent measure 
The dependent variables of interest in this study were changes 
in beliefs due to the advertising message/spokesman. These changes 
were computed from the control group means for each source belief 
mentioned in the message. Since the hypotheses concerned the differ¬ 
ences due to involvement, all subjects were first separated on this 
independent variable. The "interest" question on the bottom of page 5 
of the experimental questionnaire and on page 3 of the control group 
questionnaire (Appendix C) was this involvement measure. Subjects who 
checked on the "not at all interested" side of the center (the last 
three intervals) were classified as non-involved. Subjects who checked 
on the "extremely interested" side of the center (the first three 
intervals) were classified as involved. Subjects who checked the mid¬ 
point of this scale were not included in the analysis. 
Belief change for involved subjects was measured as the differ¬ 
ence from the mean of involved control group subjects. Belief change 
for non-involved subjects was measured as the difference from the mean 
of non-involved control group subjects. Table 15 lists the control 
group means for each involvement category. It is evident from Table 
15 that non-involved subjects have generally weaker pre-exposure be¬ 
lief strength. This may simply be an indication that subjects who 
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TABLE 15 
MEAN PRE-EXPOSURE BELIEF STRENGTHS FOR EACH 
INVOLVEMENT LEVEL - CONTROL GROUP 
Proximal belief9 
Mean 
Involved subjects 
N=38 
Mon-involved subjects 
N=40 
1 6.711 6.225 
2 3.184 3.000 
3 
X
I CO 
o
 
r-H
 • 3.375 
4 6.237 6.333c 
5 3.684 3.400 
6 4.263 3.900 
7 4.211 3.625 
8 5.605 5.125 
9 4.737 4.300 
10 5.105 4.950 
11 5.632 5.350 
12 4.081b 
o
 o
 
r-H
 • 
13 5.921 5.650 
14 4.395 4.150 
15 4.763 4.625 
aThe numbers correspond to the numbers in Table 13. 
^Only 37 control group answered this. 
c0nly 39 control group subjects answered this. 
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answer to the negative side on one scale (not at all interested) also 
answer to the negative side of other scales (very improbable). Com¬ 
puting differences by involvement category will reduce apparent dif¬ 
ferences between involvement levels due to this effect. The differ¬ 
ences were computed as (B-C) where B is the belief strength assigned 
results in negative scores if the message results in a smaller belief 
strength than the control group mean. Positive differences indicate 
favorable change. 
Balancing the experimental design 
In order to use the F-test associated with Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) designs, certain assumptions must be met (e.g., Myers, 1972, 
Chapter 4): (1) for each treatment population, the distribution of 
experimental errors is assumed normal (which implies that the distri¬ 
bution of dependent variable measures is normal); (2) for each pop¬ 
ulation, the distribution of experimental errors has a variance that 
is assumed to be the same for each treatment population -- homogeneity 
of variance (which implies that each population has the same variance 
of dependent variable observations); and (3) the errors associated 
with any pair of observations are assumed to be independent. 
The third assumption -- independence of errors -- should be met 
in the data because no dependent measure was repeated on the same sub¬ 
ject. On the possible departures from normality and homogeneity of 
variance, one suggestion is to make the group sizes large and equal 
(Hays and Winkler, 1970, pg 129). A preliminary look at the number 
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of subjects in each cell is shown in Table 16. The cell sizes were 
large and unequal. The cell in the design that had the fewest respon¬ 
dents -- low trust, high competence (the Lever Brothers chemist) for 
non-involved subjects -- contained 41 respondents. To maintain the 
robustness of the F-test, subjects were randomly deleted from the other 
7 cells until each cell contained exactly 41 respondents. 
Major computations on the data were made using the University of 
Massachusetts Computer Center version of SPSS -- Statistical Package 
for the Social Sciences (Nie, Hull, Jenkins, Steinbrenner and Bent, 
1975). 
Manipulation Check 
Page 8 of the experimental questionnaire (Appendix C) contained 
bi-polar adjectives that tapped the trust and competence dimensions of 
spokesmen in toothpaste advertisements. These adjectives had been 
carefully selected in the pre-test described in Chapter III. They were 
included in the final instrument to verify the experimental manipula¬ 
tions of trust and competence. 
Overall scores of trust and competence were computed for each 
subject by SLmr*.ing the ratings on the adjectives that tapped each 
dimension. The positive end of each scale was coded 1, the negative 
end was coded 7. All 510 respondents were used in this analysis. 
Table 17 contains the results of this analysis as well as the trust 
and competence scores of these four spokesmen in the pre-test of 
Chapter III. 
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TABLE 16 
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS IN EACH CELL OF THE 2 X 2 X 2 
DESIGN - ORIGINAL SPOKESMEN 
Involved Non-involved 
High 
Competence 
Low 
Competence 
High 
Competence 
Low 
Competence 
(Dentist) (Robert Young) (Dentist) (Robert Young) 
High 
Trust 
55 53 49 49 
(Chemist) (Johnny Carson) (Chemist) (Johnny Carson) 
Low 
Trust 58 
55 41 52 
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TABLE 17 
RESULTS OF MANIPULATION CHECK COMPARED TO PRE-TEST 
Spokesman Mean trust scorea Mean competence score*3 
Check0 Pre-testd Check0 Pre-testd 
Cleveland 
dentist 
25.2 14.5 14.3 6.9 
Robert Young 22.0 15.9 13.8 11.1 
Lever Brothers 
chemist 
23.4 20.9 11.8 7.6 
Johnny Carson 24.7 23.4 12.7 12.6 
aThe possible range is; 6=highest trust, 42=lowest trust. 
L. 
The possible range is; 4=highest competence, 28=lowest 
competence. 
cThe entries are the mean scores for all subjects exposed to 
that spokesman. 
dThe entries are the mean pre-test scores using the same set of 
bi-polar adjectives as the manipulation check. The competence scores 
differ slightly from Table 9 because the manipulation check set of 
adjectives used the bi-polar adjective pair "skilled-unskilled" in 
place of the pair "qualified-unqualified" from Table 9. The trust 
scores used the same adjectives as Table 8. 
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Table 17 clearly indicates that subjects in the experiment did 
not perceive important differences between the spokesmen. Those 
spokesmen that had been rated as high in trust in the pre-test (the 
Cleveland dentist and Robert Young) were rated significantly lower 
in trust in the experiment. In fact, the trust rank of the Cleveland 
dentist was reversed! Where he had originally been perceived as the 
most trustworthy of the four spokesmen, he was now perceived as least 
trustworthy. A similar phenomenon occurred with ratings of competence. 
Those spokesmen that had been rated as high in competence in the pre¬ 
test (the Cleveland dentist and the Lever Brothers chemist) were rated 
significantly lower in competence in the experiment. In the case of 
the low competence and low trust spokesmen, they maintained their low 
ratings. The experimental manipulation had apparently failed. 
It was explained in Chapter I that the message itself can in¬ 
fluence perceived credibility of the source. This suggests that the 
perceived trust and competence of the spokesmen could be a result of 
the message and that some parts of the advertisement might have been 
processed as intended. That is, the introduction of the Cleveland 
dentist may have elicited feelings of high trust and high competence. 
The message would then have been received and processed under this in¬ 
fluence. Since the message was not particularly detailed and convinc¬ 
ing, the perceived trust and competence of the Cleveland dentist may 
have changed due to the poor message. If this were the case, all 
spokesmen would have ended up with approximately the same ratings of 
perceived trust and competence, even though most of the message had 
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been differentially processed. It was decided to test this possibility. 
One of the most consistent findings in the communications liter¬ 
ature (see Chapter I) is that, in the absence of other message in¬ 
fluences, high trust, high competence sources (usually labeled "high 
credibility") are more effective in influencing beliefs and attitudes 
than low trust, low competence sources (usually labeled "low credibil¬ 
ity"). It is a thesis of this paper that these findings are not 
surprising, and that the two dimensions can be separated. If the ex¬ 
perimental manipulation was successful and simply not reflected in the 
manipulation check ratings, we would expect that the high trust, high 
competence spokesman (the Cleveland dentist) would have more influence 
on the dependent variables than the low trust, low competence spokesman 
(Johnny Carson). T-tests were conducted on the mean change scores for 
all dependent variables between the Cleveland dentist and Johnny 
Carson. A tendency for the Cleveland dentist to be more influential 
would lend support to the assumption that the manipulation check 
ratings were influenced by the message. No separation was made by 
involvement level. The balanced design was used for the analysis. 
Table 18 presents the results of this analysis. 
It is obvious from Table 18 that the Cleveland dentist and 
Johnny Carson had similar effects on all the dependent variables. In 
three of the non-source beliefs, differences appear significant (be¬ 
liefs 11, 12, and 13). In all three of these beliefs, the message/ 
spokesman combination produced a boomerang effect. That is, change 
was in an unfavorable direction. In two of the three beliefs, the 
Cleveland dentist produced a less favorable (or more unfavorable) 
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TABLE 18 
T-TESTS OF MEAN CHANGE SCORES BETWEEN THE 
CLEVELAND DENTIST AND JOHNNY CARSON 
Belief9 
Mean change scores 
t-value signifi cance*3 
Cleveland dentist 
N 
Johnny Carson 
N 
1 .0105 81 .0846 81 -,49c d 
2 1.1763 82 1.0550 81 .40 .345 
3 .4170 82 .5024 82 -.30 d 
4 .2272 82 .2882 82 -.37C d 
5 -.1030 82 -.1224 82 .10 .460 
6 .5402 82 .5212 81 .07 .470 
7 .5698 82 .7283 82 -.60 d 
8 .0862 82 .2570 82 -,90c d 
9 .4327 82 .4693 82 -.16 d 
10e .2042 82 .0950 81 .61 .270 
11 -2.5886 82 -2.2105 82 -1.33 d 
12 -.4375 79 -.0830 81 -1.36 d 
13 -1.0172 82 -1.5050 82 1.92 .028 
14 .0812 82 .0568 82 .10 .462 
15 -.0355 82 .1109 82 -.68 d 
aThe numbers correspond to the numbers in Table 13. 
^One-tailed, with null hypothesis of no difference, and alternate 
hypothesis of less favorable change for Johnny Carson. 
cUnequal variances approximation to t (see Nie, et al , 1975). 
Negative value of t indicates that the Cleveland dentist results 
in less favorable change than Johnny Carson--the opposite direction 
from the alternate hypothesis. 
eBeliefs 10 through 15 are beliefs not mentioned in the message, 
and are not dependent variables for the hypotheses. 
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change than Johnny Carson -- the opposite effect to what we would ex¬ 
pect if the manipulations had been successful. The overall indication 
is that the manipulations of trust and competence were unsuccessful, 
as indicated by the manipulation check. All four spokesmen were per¬ 
ceived to be low in trust and competence. 
Tests of Hypotheses 
A major assertion of this dissertation is that source credibility 
should be viewed through the eyes of the receiver (see pages 27 and 54. 
For this reason an attempt had been made to identify sources that 
differed in trust and competence in an advertisement for toothpaste 
as perceived by the subject population. A description of this attempt 
is contained in Chapter III. The manipulation check and the analysis 
of belief change described above indicated that subjects did not per¬ 
ceive differences in trust and competence due to different spokesmen. 
This finding, however, does not mean that there were no differences in 
perceived credibility within the subject population. That is, some 
subjects exposed to Johnny Carson (the presumable low trust, low 
competence spokesman) may have perceived him as very trustworthy and 
very competent. If these subjects existed, they will have been exposed 
to a high trust, high competence spokesman. Similarly, some subjects 
exposed to Robert Young (the presumably high trust, low competence 
spokesman) may have perceived him as low in trust and low in competence. 
These subjects will have been exposed to a low trust, low competence 
spokesman. In other words, regardless of the particular spokesman to 
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whom a subject had been exposed, there was likely to be some percep¬ 
tions of spokesmen in each of the trust, competence combinations. If 
subjects in each combination could be identified, the differential 
effects of source trust and source competence could be studied. An 
attempt to identify these subjects was made. 
All 510 subjects were arranged according to the trust and com¬ 
petence scores each had used to rate the spokesman to whom he had been 
exposed. A median score for each dimension was computed. Subjects 
rating the spokesman below the median on the trust dimension were de¬ 
fined as having perceived the spokesman as high trust (low scores 
implied high trust). Subjects rating the spokesman above the median 
on the trust dimension were defined as having perceived the spokesman 
as low in trust. A similar split was performed on the competence 
scores. The split on the interest question was preserved -- subjects 
who checked the midpoint were ignored. 
In view of possible violations of the assumptions for ANOVA, it 
was again desired to maintain large and equal cell sizes. A prelim¬ 
inary look at the number of subjects in each cell is shown in Table 19. 
The cell sizes were sufficiently large, but unequal. The cell with 
the fewest number of subjects contained 25 subjects. In order to bal¬ 
ance the design, subjects were randomly discarded from the other seven 
cells until each cell contained exactly 25 respondents. Tests of the 
hypotheses were conducted using these 200 subjects. 
Significance level 
In choosing a level of significance, consideration must be 
given to the relative costs of Type I and Type II errors. The null 
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TABLE 19 
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS IN EACH CELL OF THE 2 X 2 X 2 
DESIGN - SCORES SPLIT AT MEDIANS 
Involved Non-involved 
High 
Competence 
Low 
Competence 
High 
Competence 
Low 
Competence 
High 89 
Trust 
31 40 32 
t°W ♦ 25 Trust 
71 34 82 
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hypothesis that is tested in ANOVA is that there are no effects due 
to treatments or interactions. A Type I error describes the proba¬ 
bility of falsely assuming effects when none exist. Myers (1972) 
suggests that one important consideration in choosing a significance 
level (probability of a Type I error) is the "relationship between 
one's own experimental findings and those of previous studies . . . 
If significant results will conflict with an established body of 
knowledge, more stringent significance levels (e.g., .01) might be 
required" (page 50). The reasoning is that the cost of a Type I error 
in this case is in terms of time and effort that might be mistakenly 
spent by future researchers in the discipline. "On the other hand, in 
research areas where the variables influencing behavior are less well 
understood, the experimenter might be willing to take a greater risk of 
a Type I error, . . . in an attempt to avoid missing some promising 
lead." (page 50). 
This research clearly fits the latter situation. As pointed 
out in Chapter I, very little work has been done on the differential 
effects of trust and competence. The expected interaction of com¬ 
petence and involvement is highly tentative, based on apparent pat¬ 
terns that emerged from Table 1. For this reason, a significance 
level of .10 was chosen as indicative of a significant effect. How¬ 
ever, it must be pointed out that significance tests are only one 
important piece of information in experimental research and should 
not be the sole basis of judgments of the presence or absence of 
effects. 
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Target source beliefs 
As explained in Chapter II, the term source beliefs refers to 
belief statements contained in the message. Table 13 in Chapter III 
listed the source beliefs in the advertising message and further de¬ 
scribed them as being target beliefs of the marketing manager or non¬ 
target beliefs. Source beliefs #2, #5, #6, #7, and #8 in Table 13 
were target beliefs (i.e., beliefs corresponding to proximal beliefs 
that the marketing manager hoped to influence, in an attempt to in¬ 
fluence the target market's overall attitude toward purchasing and 
using his brand). The research hypotheses concerned differential 
change in proximal beliefs corresponding to source beliefs in the 
message. As an attempt at organizing the analysis of the results of 
the experiment, first target source beliefs, and then non-target 
source beliefs will be analyzed. Following this, the potential dif¬ 
ferential effects on proximal beliefs not contained in the message 
will be discussed. 
Table ID through 10D in Appendix D contain both the list of mean 
belief changes and the ANOVA tables for the five target beliefs con¬ 
tained in the message. Hypothesis 1 (a and b) predicts an interaction 
between source competence and receiver involvement. Specifically, it 
was expected that differences in belief change due to differences in 
source competence would be noticed only with non-involved subjects. 
The high competence source was expected to produce more change than 
the low competence source for these non-involyed subjects. 
Hypothesis 2 predicts a significant trust effect regardless of 
the level of receiver involvement. High trust sources were expected 
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to produce more favorable changes than low trust sources. 
Though not stated in the hypotheses, an assumption was that in¬ 
volved receivers would resist change. This implies that non-involved 
receivers would demonstrate more belief change than involved receivers. 
Therefore, a main effect of involvement was expected in this direction. 
Target belief #2 (VISTA toothpaste is made with a new type of 
fluoride) was not differentially affected by different combinations of 
source and involvement. Changes due to a high trust source tend to 
be more favorable than changes due to a low trust source, but the dif¬ 
ferences are not significant overall. The competence-involvement 
interaction is not significant, but warrants a closer look. 
Figure 2 is a graphical presentation of the competence-involve¬ 
ment effects under different combinations of source trust. An inter¬ 
esting phenomenon apparent in figure 2 is that decreasing involvement 
leads to less belief change — an opposite effect than expected! 
The competence effect is also strange. In non-involved conditions 
there is a tendency for the low competence source to produce more 
change than the high competence source. 
Both hypotheses were rejected for belief #2. 
Target belief #5 (VISTA1s fluoride compound prevents cavities 
better than other brands of fluoride toothpaste) displayed an overall 
boomerang effect. This is mainly due to low trust sources, although 
the largest boomerang effect occurred with high trust, low competence 
sources and non-involved subjects. Hypothesis 1 is again rejected. 
There is no overall interaction between source competence and receiver 
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FIGURE 2 
COMPETENCE-INVOLVEMENT INTERACTIONS FOR BELIEF #2 
High & low trust 
(o) 
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involvement. Hypothesis 2, at first glance, appears to be supported. 
Figure 3 depicts the belief changes due to different combinations of 
trust and involvement. With receivers who were involved, high trust 
sources led to significantly more favorable belief change than low 
trust sources (p = .009). The differences between high and low trust 
for non-involved subjects is not significant. Both hypotheses were 
rejected for belief #5. It should be noted that there is again a 
general tendency for non-involvement to lead to less change than in¬ 
volvement. 
Target belief #6 (VISTA toothpaste is lower in abrasives than 
other brands of fluoride toothpaste) resulted in very complex belief 
changes. There are no overall 2-way interactions, but the highly 
significant 3-way interaction suggests a closer look at the data. 
Figure 4 views the competence-involvement interactions under different 
levels of source trust. In the high trust condition (Figure 4a), 
there is no significant difference in belief change between high and 
low competence for involved receivers. Non-involved receivers display 
significantly greater change due to high competence sources than to 
low competence sources (p = .004). This effect is completely reversed 
with low trust sources (Figure 4b). Hypothesis 1 is supported only 
under high trust sources. 
Figure 5 views the trust-involvement interactions. Hypothesis 2 
is not supported in any condition. Although there is an overall trust 
effect, the difference between high and low trust is not significant 
for involved receivers (Figure 5c). 
107 
FIGURE 3 
TRUST.-INVOLVEMENT INTERACTION FOR BELIEF #5 
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FIGURE 4 
COMPETENCE-INVOLVEMENT INTERACTIONS FOR BELIEF #6 
(b) 
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FIGURE 5 
TRUST-IKVOLVEXSNT INTERACTIONS FOR EELIEF #6 
High competence 
(b) 
High k low competence 
(c) 
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Target belief #7 (VISTA toothpaste is higher in whitening ability 
than other brands of fluoride toothpaste) and target belief #8 (brush¬ 
ing with VISTA makes your mouth feel clean) are the first two beliefs 
for which involvement influenced change in the expected direction. 
That is, involved subjects exhibited less change than non-involved sub¬ 
jects. Hypothesis 1, however, was again rejected for these beliefs. 
Overall, for involved subjects, high competence sources produced more 
change than low competence sources (p = .049 for each belief), but 
there is no significant difference due to differences in competence for 
non-involved receivers. 
The trust effect is significant in both involvement conditions 
for belief #7, but only in the non-involved condition for belief #8. 
Hypothesis 2 is accepted for belief #7 and rejected for belief #8. 
This section has analyzed belief change for those beliefs con¬ 
tained in the message that were targets of change. Overall, there is 
no support for the research hypotheses, although there jte evidence that 
source trust and competence have differential effects. High trust 
sources are almost always more effective than low trust sources. The 
effects of differences in source competence are not at all consistent. 
The next section looks at those statements contained in the message 
that were not specific targets of the marketing manager. 
Non-target source beliefs 
Tables 11D through 18D in Appendix D contain both the list of 
mean belief changes and the ANOVA tables for beliefs #1, #3, #4, and 
#9 (from Table 13). These statements were specifically mentioned in 
m 
the advertising message, but were not target beliefs for attitude 
change. 
Belief #1 (VISTA toothpaste is new) had a potential for ceiling 
effects. That is, the control group believed that this statement was 
very probable (see Table 15). Not much change could be expected. 
None-the-less, Table 12D in Appendix D reveals a significant overall 
involvement effect. Non-involved subjects demonstrated significantly 
greater belief change than involved subjects. There is also a tendency 
toward 2-way interactions, though none are significant. A closer look 
at the competence-involvement interaction (Figure 6c) reveals that, 
overall, there is no difference between high and low competence for 
involved subjects, and that high competence sources produce signifi¬ 
cantly more favorable change than low competence sources for non-in- 
volved subjects (p = .04). This supports hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 2 is rejected. There is no difference between the 
mean change for high and low trust sources with involved subjects. 
Non-target belief #3 (VISTA toothpaste is not just another 
fluoride toothpaste) resulted in no overall trust or competence effect, 
and no interactions. Both hypotheses are rejected. The involvement 
effect is significant and in the expected direction. 
Non-target source belief #4 (VISTA toothpaste is made by Lever 
Brothers) is another belief where the potential for a ceiling effect 
exists. The control group subjects believed that it was very probable 
that this was true. As expected, no significant effects are evident. 
Both hypotheses are rejected. 
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FIGURE 6 
COMPETENCE-INVOLVEMENT INTERACTIONS FOR BELIEF #1 
High & low trust 
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Non-target source belief #9 (VISTA gives you fresh taste and 
cleaner teeth without sacrificing decay prevention) resulted in an 
overall trust effect for both levels of involvement. This supports 
hypothesis 2. There is no competence-involvement interaction, and 
hypothesis 1 must be rejected. Figure 7 is a closer look at the 
potential competence-involvement interactions under varying combina¬ 
tions of source trust. The only significant differences between high 
and low competence sources comes with involved subjects (p = .074 for 
both Figures 6b and 6c). 
This section looked at belief change for beliefs contained in 
the message, but for which no change was actively sought. The results 
are as mixed as the results for target beliefs. Again there seems to 
be a tendency for higher trust sources to produce more change than low 
trust sources. This difference is not consistent for differences in 
competence. 
Non-source beliefs 
Tables 19D through 30D in Appendix D contain the list of mean 
belief changes and the ANOVA tables for beliefs #10, #11, #12, #13, 
#14, and #15. None of these statements were specifically mentioned 
in the message, but it was felt that the message may somehow in¬ 
fluence them. The exact path of influence from the message to these 
potential impact effects will not be studied nor speculated upon. 
The results indicate that very little change resulted in belief #10 
(VISTA toothpaste tastes good) for any combination of source trust, 
source competence, and receiver involvement). The message stated that 
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FIGURE 7 
COMPETENCE-INVOLVEMENT INTERACTIONS FOR BELIEF #9 
High & low trust 
(o) 
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the speaker liked the taste of VISTA. There may be some relation 
between this belief and the belief that VISTA tastes good, but the 
connection is not strong. 
A very interesting result emerged for belief #11 (VISTA tooth¬ 
paste has the seal of approval of the American Dental Association). 
A strong boomerang effect resulted for every source-receiver combina¬ 
tion. Given information only that a new fluoride toothpaste existed, 
the control group subjects had believed that it was moderately probable 
that it enjoyed this endorsement (Table 15). After experimental sub¬ 
jects were exposed to a message that made no mention of such endorse¬ 
ment, they believed that it was moderately improbable that the seal of 
approval existed. The impact effect was not due to a source belief in 
the message, but rather to the absence of any mention of the seal of 
approval. There are strong interactions between competence and involve¬ 
ment, but in quite unexpected directions. 
Figure 8 makes the competence-involvement interaction clearer. 
Involved receivers display a consistently smaller boomerang effect for 
high than for low competence sources. The opposite is true for non- 
involved receivers. The only competence difference that is significant 
is for non-involved receivers over levels of trust (Figure 8c; p = 
.06). In this case, low competence sources result in more favorable 
change. 
Belief #12 (VISTA toothpaste works like a mouthwash) also re¬ 
sulted in a tendency toward a boomerang effect. This attribute was 
not specifically mentioned in the message, and only involved receivers 
116 
FIGURE 8 
COMPETENCE-INVOLVEMENT INTERACTIONS FOR BELIEF #11 
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exposed to a high competence source displayed positive change. There 
are main effects for both competence and involvement. The competence 
effect is in the expected direction (i.e., high competence sources 
result in more favorable change), but the involvement effect is in 
the opposite direction than expected. Non-involved subjects had con¬ 
sistently less favorable change than involved subjects. 
Non-source belief #13 (VISTA toothpaste sells at about the same 
price as other national brands of fluoride toothpaste) again resulted 
in consistent boomerang effects. No mention of price was made in the 
message. This resulted in belief that it was less probable that the 
statement was true. 
Non-source beliefs #14 and #15 (VISTA toothpaste prevents cavi¬ 
ties, and VISTA toothpaste whitens teeth) were not specifically men¬ 
tioned in the advertising message, but they are more closely related 
to statements in the message than the other non-source beliefs. The 
message stated that VISTA prevents cavities and whitens teeth better 
than other brands. The only significant effect for belief #14 is the 
trust-involvement interaction. For involved subjects, the low and 
high trust means are not significantly different. For non-involved 
subjects, the high trust mean is significantly higher than the low 
trust mean (p = .056). 
There are significant main effects of both trust and competence 
for belief #15. High trust and high competence sources result in more 
favorable change than low trust and low competence sources. The sig¬ 
nificant trust-involvement interaction results from no significant 
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difference between means of high and low trust for involved subjects, 
but significantly larger means for the high trust source with non- 
involved subjects (p = .004). 
This section simply looked at the results for non-source beliefs. 
The research hypotheses were not tested. They were expected to be 
true only for source beliefs. Any differences due to differential 
effects of source trust and source competence are merely expository. 
The exact nature of the relation between source beliefs and the 6 
non-source beliefs is problematical. There were no consistent trust 
or competence effects for these beliefs. 
Summary 
This chapter explained the preliminary procedures followed in 
the analysis of the experimental results, described the manipulation 
check procedure, and tested the research hypotheses. The dependent 
variable was belief change from the control group for 9 source beliefs 
contained in the message. 
The manipulation check revealed that the expected levels of 
trust and competence for the four chosen spokesmen did not materialize. 
Experimental subjects perceived all spokesmen as equally low in trust 
and competence. It was then argued that receiver perceptions of spokes¬ 
man trust and competence may give us the necessary split on these two 
dimensions. Accordingly, the subjects were assigned to cells of high 
or low trust and competence on the basis of the trust and competence 
scores they had given to the spokesman to whom they had been exposed. 
119 
The cells were balanced to contain an equal number of respondents in 
each. 
Tests on this balanced design resulted in rejection of all re¬ 
search hypotheses overall. Only one belief resulted in the expected 
interaction between source competence and receiver involvement. 
Analysis of the 9 source beliefs did, however, support the argument 
that source trust and source competence have differential effects on 
belief acceptance. 
The last part of the chapter explained potential impact effects. 
The ANOVA tables for the 6 non-source beliefs that were measured were 
analyzed. The most interesting result concerned the boomerang effects 
that occurred for unstated beliefs that could have been product claims. 
The advertising message made no mention of a seal of approval, mouth¬ 
wash effects of the brand, or similar price. Subjects then rejected 
the probability that these attributes were present. 
References 
Hays, W.L., and R.L. Winkler. Statistics (Vol 2). New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1970. 
Myers, J.L. Fundamentals of Experimental Design. Boston: Allyn and 
Bacon, 1972. 
Nie, N.H., C.H. Hull, J.G. Jenkins, K. Steinbrenner, and D.H. Bent. 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (2nd ed). New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1975. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter will first review some of the research questions 
raised in Chapters I and II and then explain the research results. 
Following this, an explanation of the limitations of this research will 
be offered. Finally, suggestions for future research will be reviewed. 
Review of Research Questions 
Restatement of where the research fits 
It was pointed out in Chapter I that attitude change is a valid 
marketing goal — particularly potential buyer's attitudes toward pur¬ 
chasing and using the brand in question. Within the framework of a 
multi-attribute attitude model, three ways that buyer's attitudes can 
be changed were discussed. Each of these ways involved exposure to 
and acceptance of new information on the part of the buyer. It was 
argued that be!iefs about the degree to which a brand possesses salient 
attributes are the fundamental building blocks of the attitude toward 
purchasing and using that brand. Therefore, it was further argued, 
changes in the strengths of these salient beliefs should lead to changes 
in the attitude. This research was an attempt to differentially in¬ 
fluence the salient beliefs about purchasing and using a new brand of 
toothpaste. 
A review of the credibility literature resulted in the tempting 
hint that variations in source trust have a different effect on re¬ 
ceivers than variations in source competence — particularly as they 
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interact with different facilitators or inhibitors of message ac¬ 
ceptance. It was suspected that trustworthy sources are always more 
effective than untrustworthy sources and that the effect of com¬ 
petent sources, vis a vis non-competent sources, depends on the 
presence or absence of other message influencers. 
The research goal was to differentially influence salient be- 
1iefs about purchasing and using a new brand of toothpaste, under the 
assumption that attitudes would be differentially influenced. The 
assumed managerial goal was to influence buyer's attitudes toward 
purchasing and using the brand. 
The research was to be conducted in an advertising setting. This 
setting introduced an added research question: does the advertising 
context contaminate the potential trustworthiness of spokesmen? The 
next section discusses this question, and the findings of this re¬ 
search. 
Advertising as a contaminant of spokesman "credibility" 
Any advertisement can be thought of as consisting of a com¬ 
bination of sources: the company itself may vary along dimensions 
of competence and trust; the advertising vehicle (the particular 
television or radio program or magazine) may vary similarly; or the 
product spokesman may be perceived as high or low in trust or com¬ 
petence. If these effects are additive, it should be possible, by 
holding the company and vehicle constant, to vary the overall source 
trust and competence through variations in spokesman trust and com¬ 
petence. The first research question, then, concerned this issue. 
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The pre-test described in Chapter III held the brand constant 
with an unidentified advertising vehicle, and varied only the spokes¬ 
man in an advertising context. The results lent support to the belief 
that the audience's perceptions of the various sources within an ad¬ 
vertisement were additive. That is, differences in trust and com¬ 
petence did exist. In fact, very large differences were evident for 
some pairs of potential spokesmen even though advertising itself may 
have been perceived as untrustworthy. When it came time for subjects 
to rate spokesmen within an advertisement, however, the differences 
disappeared. This finding alone has grave implications for marketing 
managers. 
The actual process that advertisers go through in choosing prod¬ 
uct spokesmen is not public knowledge. Findings and beliefs of par¬ 
ticular agencies and manufacturers are "trade secrets" that give 
individual companies apparent competitive advantages. A hint at the 
procedures was revealed, however, in an issue of Time magazine (1973). 
A. R. Nelson Research, Inc., a marketing research organization had 
conducted a study to determine what sports personalities are more 
likely to be trusted by consumers for product endorsements. The re¬ 
search company had polled potential buyers of various products and 
offered them a list of sports personalities. The personalities were 
rated somehow (apparently on at least a trust dimension). The con¬ 
clusions of the study included the statement that "an athlete's 
potential success as an endorser depends not on his skill or fame, but 
on his '1ikabi1ity1 by the public. And what the public appears to 
like is the quiet, comfortable old-shoe personalities — not the 
124 
abrasive or swinging types" (page 8). 
These conclusions were based on the finding that the less 
flamboyant personalities (e.g., Stan Musiel, Micky Mantle, and Yogi 
/ 
Berra) received the highest trust ratings as product spokesmen by 
potential consumers. Joe Namath ranked 156th and Muhammad Ali came 
in 190th. 
It would be naive to think that a professional research organi¬ 
zation like A. R. Nelson conducted this study out of scientific 
curiosity. More than likely the research was contracted for the pur¬ 
pose of choosing a spokesman. As stated above, the purpose and com¬ 
plete results are usually treated as "trade secrets". However, not 
long after this, a likable, quiet, comfortable, old-shoe sports 
personality became a spokesman for coffee makers. 
The point being made is that this dissertation used a similar 
pre-advertising method to choose trustworthy and competent spokesmen 
and went one step further by also choosing contrasting spokesmen. 
The manipulation check after the advertisement revealed no perceived 
difference in trust, and suprisingly, no perceived difference in com¬ 
petence. The advertising context had overpowered potential trust and 
competence differences! In the A. R. Nelson study, Stan Musiel was 
the most trustworthy endorser and Muhammad Ali was the least trust¬ 
worthy endorser before any advertisement. The manipulation failure 
of this dissertation suggests the possibility that these differences 
may not have existed in an actual advertisement and that a less than 
optimal choice was made. To explain this statement, a brief descrip- 
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tion of potential effects of spokesmen on consumer information pro¬ 
cessing is in order. 
Consumer information processing 
It has been argued (e.g., Engel, Kollat, and Blackwell, 1973) 
that consumers must go through a series of steps in processing in¬ 
coming messages. They must first be exposed to a message, they must 
attend to it, comprehend its meaning, and then retain it in some memory 
for further processing. In Chapter I it was pointed out that consumers 
pass through a series of stages prior to purchase that begins with 
awareness and ends with purchase. Different theorists specify a 
different number of stages (see Robertson, 1971, Chapter three for a 
discussion of three different views) between awareness and purchase. 
Any of the stages can serve as a target for advertising strategy and 
be the point of "further processing" of the incoming message. 
Figure 9 represents both the consumer's information processing 
stages and his product adoption stages. The particular product adop- 
i 
tion stages in Figure 9 has been named the "hierarchy of effects" 
model by Pal da (1966). In this research, the targets of the advertise¬ 
ment were the liking and preference stages of this model. Before the 
advertisement's information can influence liking and preference, it 
roust be successfully processed by the receiver. What are some of the 
managerially controllable things that can influence the consianer's in¬ 
formation processing and the degree of liking and preference he has 
for a brand? 
Exposure is clearly a media scheduling problem. In the lab¬ 
oratory situation of this research, all subjects were exposed to the 
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FIGURE 9 
RELATION BETWEEN STEPS IN CONSUMER INFORMATION 
PROCESSING AND STAGES OF PRODUCT ADOPTION 
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advertisement. Research in cognitive psychology (see e.g., Neisser, 
1967, and Norman 1969) suggests that the probability that a consumer 
will attend to a message increases with increasing familiarity of the 
stimulus package. A well-known, flamboyant personality should, there¬ 
fore, result in more consumer attention to the message than a less 
familiar, old-shoe personality. Comprehension and retention are more 
influenced by copy and message design than by spokesmen. 
With regards to the A. R. Nelson study, this means that well 
known, flamboyant personalities in an advertisement will result in 
more attention and therefore, other things equal, more successful 
information processing by consumers than less well-known figures. At 
this point the result is more receivers ready to process further. Now, 
what about the effect of different spokesmen on the liking and pref¬ 
erence stages of the product adoption model? 
According to Kelman (see Chapter I) increased source "credibility" 
(higher trust and higher competence) leads to internalization of the 
message arguments and more lasting favorable attitudes, while attrac¬ 
tiveness and likability lead to identification with the source and 
imitation. A trustworthy, competent source will influence the liking 
and preference stages more favorably than less trustworthy, less 
competent sources. If the more flamboyant personalities are less 
trusted than the old-shoe personalities, but more attractive, their 
value in influencing these two stages (liking and preference) will be 
low. However, this dissertation has inadvertently introduced the 
possibility that the old-shoe personalities and the more flamboyant 
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personalities are perceived as equally low in trust and competence. 
If this is true, they do not differ in their influence on these stages 
of the adoption process, and more flamboyant, better known personal¬ 
ities are clearly more valuable for this advertising goal because of 
their favorable impact on attention and information processing. 
Interpretation of Results 
Because of the manipulation failure, the results of this research 
cannot be confidently interpreted. The original research design called 
for a treatment X treatment X blocks design, where the two treatments 
were source trust and source competence and the receivers were to be 
assigned to blocks on the basis of their interest level. The results 
reported in Chapter IV are based on something like a blocks X blocks 
X blocks design with no experimental treatment. That is, subjects 
were assigned to cells solely on the basis of the way they answered 
the questionnaire. The argument that trust and competence are per¬ 
ceptual variables of the receiver still holds, but it is also very 
likely that some subjects who actually were under the influence of a 
high trust, low competence source were analyzed in the low-trust, low- 
competence cell because of their tendency to answer to the low side 
of the rating scales. Some support for this argument is evident in 
Table 19 of Chapter IV. When trust and competence ratings were split 
at the medians, almost 70 percent of the respondents were on the same 
side of the median for both dimensions. That is, about 70 percent of 
the subjects gave the spokesman the same trust rating and competence 
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rating. They answered on the same side of the rating scale. 
The manipulation failure is the principal reason for difficult 
interpretation of the research results. One other factor that con¬ 
tributes to difficult interpretation is the experimental procedure 
itself. The large number of F-values less than 1 in the Analyses of 
Variance is a tip-off that something was amiss. These small F-values 
result from consistently smaller treatment variability than residual 
variability. One possible explanation for this is that all the sub¬ 
jects (both experimental and control) did not come from the same 
population. 
During the experiment, there was no obvious reason to suspect 
that different sections of business students differed in any important 
way from each other; but "obvious" reasons are easier to see after- 
the-fact. A total of 22 sections were used. Four sections were used 
as the control group, eighteen sections read the advertisement. Each 
instructor has a different teaching philosophy and puts different 
emphasis on various parts of the course he teaches. At some time 
during the semester, all sections of Marketing students discuss the 
advertising function and new product introduction, and some instructors 
cover deception in advertising and source credibility effects of ad¬ 
vertising. It is possible that entire sections of subjects (because 
they differed in coverage of these topics) entered the experiment with 
vastly different frames of reference, vis a vis belief of advertising 
and product claims, than other sections. Approximately one-fourth of 
each section was exposed to each spokesman, and these large differences 
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between starting points will have been present in each cell of the 
design. This introduces systematic variance in the data, resulting 
in large within-group variance. 
The control groups came from four separate sections. The above 
argument can be expanded to show that if some experimental sections 
started with lower belief strengths than the control sections, positive 
belief change would reflect as negative change from the control group 
means. This would tend to lessen the observed effect. These "obvious" 
differences between subject populations were not, unfortunately, quite 
as obvious before-the-fact. 
Discussion of the Theory 
Given the above possibilities, it is true that any results would 
be largely non-interpretable. None-the-less, it would be expected 
* 
that the experimental naivete would result in similar effects for all 
the dependent variables if the theoritical assumptions were valid. The 
results were not the same, suggesting a re-thinking of the assumptions. 
The important assumptions were: (1) source trust and source 
competence act separately on destination variables — an expansion of 
the term "source credibility"; (2) source competence acts as a message 
facilitator in influencing proximal beliefs; and (3) interest in dif¬ 
ferences among brands reflects involvement with brand choice. 
Differential effects of source trust and source competence 
This assumption still holds. Table 1 remains the primary in¬ 
dicator of its validity, and the experimental results show almost 
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consistent positive effects of trust. Source competence effects are 
very much inconsistent. Sometimes high competence resulted in favor¬ 
able change, sometimes low competence. 
Source competence as a facilitator 
The research hypotheses predicted a significant competence effect 
for non-involved receivers for all source beliefs in the message. 
Upon further reflection, this is unreasonable. It is more reasonable 
to believe that competence will facilitate belief acceptance only for 
those statements that demand some type of expertise relative to the 
receiver's. For example, a research chemist's expertise is in the 
area of research chemistry. If he tells a potential buyer that a new 
toothpaste tastes good, he, as a source of information, is no more a 
facilitator of acceptance than Johnny Carson. Neither of these 
sources knows what tastes good to the receiver. The receiver himself 
is the most competent source for this statement. However, if both 
the research chemist and Johnny Carson explain the decay prevention 
formula of the brand, the chemist's competence can facilitate accep¬ 
tance -- especially for receivers who are not research chemists. In 
other words, it is likely that competence is measurable relative to 
the receiver. 
Interest as a measure of involvement 
It was stated in Chapters I and II that involvement with the topic 
of a communication will result in resistance to change. Buyers who 
were involved with brand choice were expected to be brand loyal and 
to resist influence attempts. It was argued that any measure of in¬ 
volvement must tap something internal to the buyer that is expected 
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to reflect these feelings. Day (1974) argued that interest in dif¬ 
ferences among brands reflects this type of involvement. The results 
of this research refute this claim. Interest had no consistent effect. 
For target beliefs #2 and #5, increasing interest resulted in increas¬ 
ing change, but for target beliefs #7 and #8, increasing interest re¬ 
sulted in decreasing change, as expected. 
It may be that interest in differences among brands does tap the 
involvement construct, but that involvement is belief specific just as 
competence is. That is, only certain salient beliefs about products 
are held with centrality and the interest measure indicates involvement 
only for these particular beliefs. No way is suggested for identifying 
those beliefs. 
This question revives interest in a second research problem pre¬ 
sented in Chapter I; can we identify receiver variables that facilitate 
or inhibit message acceptance? No attempt has been made to answer this 
question beyond assuming that involvement inhibits message acceptance. 
The problem remains open. 
Limitations 
Most of the limitations of this research have already been dis¬ 
cussed. The failure to create differences in source trust and source 
competence overshadows any other weaknesses that affect interpretation 
of the results. The most important managerial result is the finding 
that experimental product spokesmen did not differ on trust and com¬ 
petence dimensions in an advertisement* This finding is important 
because spokesmen have, in the past, been chosen because pre-tests 
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indicated that these differences did^ exist. This finding should be 
viewed as tentative for three reasons. First, the advertisement was 
not real. Subjects read only what was said to be the sound track 
of a 30-second advertisement. The purpose of this research made it 
necessary to create a message that said only certain things. Actual 
advertisements are usually much more creative. In addition, the visual 
portions of advertisements add more meaning to a message as well as a 
new dimension. The manipulation failure may have been caused by the 
message and setting. 
The second limitation that restricts the scope of this finding 
is the subject pool itself. Business students are exposed to much more 
information concerning advertising and marketing than most target 
markets. They entered the experimental setting with a completely dif¬ 
ferent frame-of-reference than other potential toothpaste buyers. 
A third limitation is the experimental setting itself. This 
would not have been a limitation for interpretation of the hypothesized 
results because the study involved the question of the existence of a 
psychological phenomenon. Generalizing beyond the experimental setting 
for the manipulation failure can be done, however, with little con¬ 
fidence. In actual advertising situations, the message and the spokes¬ 
man are presented more subtly. Consumers can often repeat product 
claims a day or two after exposure to an advertisement and not know 
for sure where they heard it (Bogart, 1967, chapter 6). Actual ad¬ 
vertising also is repeated at various intervals and possible judgments 
of a spokesman's trust or competence may be cumulative over many 
repetitions. Additionally, in the experimental situation, subjects 
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were fully aware that the questions concerned the advertisement they had 
just read and may have answered in a manner they thought reflected 
mature, worldly-wise responses. That is, it may be difficult for a 
person to admit that he believes the advertisement and trusts the 
spokesman when "everybody knows" that it's all a lie. Very few 
student consumers ever admit that they succumb to advertising's 
enticements, but most use well advertised brands. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
This research and the hypotheses associated with it should be 
repeated with two precautions. First, the pre-test to choose spokes¬ 
men who differ on the dimensions of trust and competence should be 
conducted using the same advertisement and cover story as the final 
experiment. That is, instead of asking subjects to rate Johnny Carson 
"in an advertisement for toothpaste," Johnny Carson (and others) should 
be presented in an advertisement for toothpaste and then rated — just 
as in the final instrument of this research. The reason for this 
first precaution is now obvious -- for some reason, raters perceive 
these as different situations. Spokesmen identified in this manner 
can then be used in the final experiment. 
The second precaution demands more careful pre-test research 
into the operationalization of the involvement construct. One possible 
direction to pursue is to separate buyers on the basis of brand 
loyalty and on the basis of important product attributes. For example, 
buyers who are loyal to Crest toothpaste who feel that taste is the 
most important attribute in toothpastes may be very involved in the 
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belief that Crest is the best tasting toothpaste. That is, they may 
hold this belief with some degree of centrality and resist accepting 
contrary information. They may easily accept information about price 
and fluoride content because they are not involved with these attri¬ 
butes. The involvement/competence interaction would be expected only 
for those beliefs identified as being held this way. 
Other possible research concerns the search for other receiver 
variables that facilitate or inhibit message acceptance. Extension of 
other research is the most obvious direction for this search. For 
example, in the Si gall and Helmreich study discussed in Chapter I (see 
Table 2, pg 22), it was shown that receiver stress facilitates message 
acceptance when the source has low competence but not under high com¬ 
petence sources and that competence is a facilitator only under low 
stress conditions. Source trust was not varied in that experiment. 
What would be expected if it were varied? Table 20 is a possible 
result based on the theory developed in this dissertation. High trust 
sources would be consistently more effective than low trust sources; 
high competence sources would be more effective than low competence 
sources only with low stress receivers; and, not obvious from Table 20, 
each cell of high stress receivers would result in a more favorable 
effect than the corresponding cell of low stress receivers. 
The effect of source trust and competence on the discrepancy 
mediator in the Fishbein-Ajzen model of the change process is another 
fertile area for related research. Fishbein and Ajzen would argue 
that source beliefs in the message ("VISTA toothpaste is lower in 
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abrasives") should be thought of as being held with a strength of 1, 
and that discrepancy between source and pre-exposure proximal beliefs 
should be computed from that. Is it possible that the particular source 
influences this perceived source belief strength? It has been the 
position of this dissertation that it is. The question remains open, 
but it is logical to assume that sources who are perceived as deceptive 
may result in lower perceived source belief strengths than more honest 
sources. This assumption was made in the dissertation, but not tested. 
It is worthy of testing. 
Any further research into the interaction of source trust and 
source competence with other variables will be treading on new ground. 
To date, no researcher has published results of studies concerned with 
this problem. Any findings will contribute to the development of an 
overall theory of communication. 
Summary 
This chapter reviewed the research questions raised in Chapters 
I and II. This was preceded by a restatement of where this research 
fits. Interpretation of the research results proved difficult be¬ 
cause of the manipulation failure. However, one important managerial 
result was explained. After some limitations that affect interpreta¬ 
tion of these results were listed, suggestions for future research 
were reviewed. 
Two important values of this dissertation have been identified. 
The first has to do with the managerial implications of the manipula- 
tion failure. The second value of this dissertation lies in its 
unsolved problems as directions for future research. 
139 
References 
Boqart, L. Strategy in Advertising. New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
Worl d7967. - 
Day, G.S. "Attitude Stability, Changeability, and Predictive Ability," 
in J.U. Farley, J.A. Howard, and L.W. Ring (eds.). Consumer 
Behavior: Theory and Application. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 
T974Y pp T30-T46. 
Engel, J.F., D.T. Kollat, and R.D. Blackwell. Consumer Behavior 
(2nd ed). New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973. 
Neisser, U. Cognitive Psychology. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 1967. 
Norman, D.A. Memory and Attention. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
1969. 
Pal da, K.S. "The Hypothesis of a Hierarchy of Effects: A Partial 
Evaluation." Journal of Marketing Research, _3, (February 1966), 
13-24. 
Robertson, T.S. Innovative Behavior and Communication. New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971. 
APPENDIX A 
QUESTIONNAIRES USED TO CHOOSE 
PRODUCT AND SPOKESMEN 
141 
QUESTIONNAIRE #1 
How interested are you in differences among brands of --varied-- ? 
(please circle one) 
Extremely 
interested 
Very 
interested 
Somewhat 
interested 
Slightly 
interested 
Not at all 
interested 
How confident are you in your ability to judge between different 
brands of --varied-- ? (please circle one) 
Extremely 
confident 
Very 
confident 
Somewhat 
confident 
Slightly 
confident 
Not at all 
confident 
In the space below, please list all available brands of -varied-- that 
you are aware of. Don't worry about spelling. If you need more space, 
raise your hand and the instructor will help you. 
Do you purchase —varied—? (circle one) Yes No 
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QUESTIONNAIRE #2 
SPRING 1976 TOOTHPASTE SURVEY 
We are working on a problem concerning spokesmen for different 
products. Please read the scene below and tell us who you believe 
would most likely cause the described reaction. 
SCENE 
A UMASS student is watching television. A commercial break 
occurs during the program. It's a toothpaste commercial. The 
advertisement begins with an introduction by an off-camera voice: 
"Here's (name) with a word about toothpaste." 
Before anything else is seen or heard, the student gets the 
feeling that the person who is about to speak about toothpaste really 
knows what he (she) is talking about and is in a position to be very 
knowledgeable about toothpaste and toothpaste use. 
Furthermore, the UMASS student viewer believes that this 
spokesperson would not say anything about any product unless he (she) 
believed it personally and would not appear in any advertisement 
which required him (her) to say something that he (she) did not 
agree with. 
Who is this spokesperson?_. 
*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$* 
The questions below will help us determine something about 
students' perception of toothpaste. 
1) How interested are you in differences among brands of toothpaste? 
(please circle one) 
Extremely Very Somewhat Slightly Not at all 
interested interested interested interested interested 
2) How confident are you in your ability to judge between different 
brands of toothpaste? (please circle one) 
Extremely Very Somewhat Slightly Not at all 
confident confident confident confident confident 
3) In the space below please list the kinds of things (e.g., product 
attributes, consequences of using the product, etc.) that a 
typical University of Massachusetts student looks for when select¬ 
ing a brand of toothpaste for her/his own consumption. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE #3 
SPRING 1976 TOOTHPASTE SURVEY 
We are working on a problem concerning spokesmen for different 
products. Please read the scene below and tell us who you believe 
would most likely cause the described reaction. 
SCENE 
A UMASS student is watching television. A commercial break 
occurs during the program. It's a toothpaste commercial. The 
advertisement begins with an introduction by an off-camera voice: 
"Here's (name) with a word about toothpaste." 
Before anything else is seen or heard, the student gets the 
feeling that the person who is about to speak about toothpaste really 
knows what he (she) is talking about and is in a position to be very 
knowledgeable about toothpaste and toothpaste use. 
However, the UMASS student viewer believes that this spokesperson 
is appearing in the advertisement just for the money, probably does 
not mean a word he (she) is about to say, and maybe even uses a 
different brand of toothpaste in real life. 
Who is this spokesperson? 
*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$* 
(same questions as in questionnaire #2) 
QUESTIONNAIRE #4 
SPRING 1976 TOOTHPASTE SURVEY 
We are working on a problem concerning spokesmen for different 
products. Please read the scene below and tell us who you believe 
would most likely cause the described reaction. 
SCENE 
A UMASS student is watching television. A commercial break 
occurs during the program. It's a toothpaste commercial. The 
advertisement begins with an introduction by an off-camera voice: 
"Here's (name) with a word about toothpaste." 
Before anything else is seen or heard, the student gets the 
feeling that the person who is about to speak about toothpaste is 
not in a position to know anything special about toothpaste and 
toothpaste use and is probably not very knowledgeable on the topic. 
However, the UMASS student viewer believes that this spokes¬ 
person would not say anything about any product unless he (she) 
believed it personally and would not appear in any advertisement 
which required him (her) to say something that he (she) did not 
agree with. 
Who is this spokesperson? 
*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$ 
(same questions as in questionnaire #2) 
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QUESTIONNAIRE #5 
SPRING 1976 TOOTHPASTE SURVEY 
We are working on a problem concerning spokesmen for different 
products. Please read the scene below and tell us who you believe 
would most likely cause the described reaction. 
SCENE 
A UMASS student is watching television. A commercial break 
occurs during the program. It's a toothpaste commercial. The 
advertisement begins with an introduction by an off-camera voice: 
"Here's (name) with a word about toothpaste." 
Before anything else is seen or heard, the student gets the 
feeling that the person who is about to speak about toothpaste is 
not in a position to know anything special about toothpaste and 
toothpaste use and is probably not very knowledgeable on the topic. 
Furthermore, the UMASS student viewer believes that this spokes¬ 
person is appearing in the advertisement just for the money, prob¬ 
ably does not mean a word he (she) is about to say, and maybe even 
uses a different brand of toothpaste in real life. 
Who is this spokesperson? 
*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$*$* 
(same questions as in questionnaire #2) 
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QUESTIONNAIRE #6 
On this page, I would like you to think of the characteristics 
that an advertising spokesman has that are important to you in 
evaluating what s/he has to say. You should think of those character¬ 
istics which in general are important to you. That is, I am not ask¬ 
ing for the qualities that any specific advertising spokesman has, but 
only general qualities. 
Specifically, I would like you to list below in the left hand 
column a quality which is important to you in judging an advertising 
spokesman. Then in the right hand column, list the quality that an 
advertising spokesman might have that is the opposite of the quality in 
the left hand column. Remember, first write down the quality in the 
left hand column and then its opposite in the right hand column. 
Continue to do so until you generate most of the qualities that you 
feel are important. You may continue on the back of the page if 
necessary. 
Important Qualities Opposite Qualities 
1 1 
2 2 
- 
3 3 
4 4 
5 5 
6 6 
7 7 
8 8 
9 9 
10 10 
11 11 
12 12 
13 13 
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QUESTIONNAIRE #7 
We are working on a study trying to understand how people 
perceive other people in different situations. 
On the next few pages you will find the name of a person and 
a description of a situation. Following this description is a series 
of measurement scales with words at either end. Please place a check 
mark ( /) in the space on the scale that most accurately reflects your 
feelings about this person in this situation. 
For example, if the person is Randolph Bromery and the situation 
is playing lead guitar in a rock group, you might check the measure¬ 
ment scales as follows: 
unfriendly : • • l/friendly 
just : :/ unjust 
/i nexperienced 
These answers would mean that you think that Randolph Bromery 
in this situation is extremely inexperienced, extremely friendly, and 
neither just nor unjust. 
There is only one situation described in the following pages. 
You are asked to rate four different people in this situation. Please 
rate one person/situation combination on all scales before continuing 
to the next one. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE #7 
(cont'd) 
(Jhe next two pages contain the list of semantic differential- 
type scales that subjects used to rate potential spokesmen. The third 
page is a list of introductory paragraphs. Each questionnaire had a 
different introductory paragraph at the beginning of each page of bi¬ 
polar advectives.) 
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QUESTIONNAIRE #7 (cont'd) 
SCALES USED TO EVALUATE POTENTIAL SPOKESMEN 
OPEN MINDED. 
BOLD 
ENTHUSIASTIC 
ATTRACTIVE. 
FRIENDLY. 
CONCERNED. 
KNOWLEDGEABLE. 
ABLE. 
TRUSTWORTHY 
ENTERTAINING. 
SINCERE. 
WARM. 
APPROPRIATE. 
FRANK 
SKILLED. 
REASONABLE. 
INTERESTING. 
HONEST 
IMPORTANT. 
KIND. 
EXTROVERTED 
RELIABLE. 
ACTIVE. 
FAIR. 
TRUTHFUL 
ENERGETIC. 
FAMILIAR 
NARROW MINDED 
TIMID 
BORING 
UGLY 
UNFRIENDLY 
INDIFFERENT 
UNCERTAIN 
INEPT 
UNTRUSTWORTHY 
BORING 
.INSINCERE 
HOSTILE 
.INAPPROPRIATE 
.RESERVED 
UNSKILLED 
UNREASONABLE 
.DULL 
DISHONEST 
UNIMPORTANT 
CRUEL 
INTROVERTED 
UNRELIABLE 
PASSIVE 
UNFAIR 
DECEIVING 
.TIRED 
STRANGE 
HELPFUL UNHaPFUL 
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QUESTIONNAIRE #7 (cont'd) 
SAFE • • UNSAFE 
RELEVANT IRRELEVANT 
ALOOF APPROACHABLE 
APPEALING UNAPPEALING 
INFORMED UNINFORMED 
BELIEVABLE NOT BELIEVABLE 
UNSELFISH SELFISH 
JUST UNJUST 
TRAINED UNTRAINED 
CASUAL FORMAL 
EMPHATIC HESITANT 
AGGRESSIVE MEEK 
SURE UNSURE 
INTERESTED APATHETIC 
EXPERIENCED INEXPERIENCED 
UNBIASED BIASED 
QUALIFIED UNQUALIFIED 
PROFESSIONAL UNPROFESSIONAL 
MOTIVATED UNMOTIVATED 
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QUESTIONNAIRE #7 (cont'd) 
INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPHS 
Place a check mark In the space that most accurately reflects your feelings about Dr. 
William James, who is a member of the board of directors of the American Dental Association, 
in an advertisement for toothpaste. 
Place a check mark in the space that most accurately reflects your feelings about 
psychologist Dr. Joyce Brothers in an advertisement for toothpaste. 
Place a check mark in the space that most accurately reflects your feelings about Dr. 
John Hunt, who is a Cleveland, Ohio, dentist, in an advertisement for toothpaste. 
Place a check mark In the space that most accurately reflects your feelings about 
actor Robert Young, who portrays Dr. Marcus Welby on television, in an advertisement for 
toothpaste. 
Place a check mark In the space that most accurately reflects your feelings abour Dr. 
Robert Davis, who is a chemist for the Food and Drug Administration,in an advertisement 
for toothpaste. 
Place a check mark in the space that most accurately reflects your feelings about pro 
football quarterback Joe Namath In an advertisement for toothpaste. 
Place a check mark in the space that most accurately reflects your feelings about 
Olympic gold medal winner Mark Spitz in an advertisement for toothpaste. 
Place a check mark in the space that most accurately reflects your feelings about 
Tonight show host Johnny Carson In an advertisement for toothpaste. 
Place a check mark in the space that most accurately reflects your feelings about 
tennis personality Bobby Riggs in an advertisement for toothpaste. 
Place a check mark in the space that most accurately reflects your feelings about 
actor/comedian Bill Cosby in an advertisement for toothpaste. 
Place a check mark in the space that most accurately reflects your feelings about 
entertainer Bob Hope in an advertisement for toothpaste. 
Place a check mark in the space that most accurately reflects your feelings about 
housewife and mother Mrs. Ann Howard in an advertisement for toothpaste. 
Place a check mark In the space that most accurately reflects your feelings about 
Tonight show announcer Ed McMahon in an advertisement for toothpaste. 
Place a check mark in the space that most accurately reflects your feelings about 
entertainer Mario Thomas in an advertisement for toothpaste. 
Place a check mark in the space that most accurately reflects your feelings about Jr. 
Harold Carlson, who is a Lever Brothers' chemist, in an advertisement for a Lever Brothers' 
brand of toothpaste. 
Place a check mark in the space that most accurately reflects your feelings about 
television entertainer Carol Burnett in an advertisement for toothpaste. 
APPENDIX B 
RESULTS OF FACTOR ANALYSES FOR 
CHOICE OF SPOKESMEN 
FACTOR LOADINGS FOR THE CLEVELAND DENTIST 
OPEN MINDED .17704 .01011 .39239 
BOLD .26002 .18412 .11434 
ENTHUSIASTIC .28021 -.05515 .30406 
ATTRACTIVE .01521 .34528 -.06804 
FRIENDLY .20393 .13559 -.09083 
CONCERNED .57648 -.10826 .24106 
KNOWLEDGEABLE .74758 -.17588 .10551 
ABLE .65165 .07160 .21748 
TRUSTWORTHY .55681 .17137 .47079 
ENTERTAINING .02843 .58964 .24803 
SINCERE .40043 .14269 .50533 
WARM .21734 .39509 .05138 
APPROPRIATE .71773 .23519 .09083 
FRANK .49437 -.02417 .30492 
SKILLED .78180 .14996 .08929 
REASONABLE .53149 .14777 .28468 
INTERESTING .16010 .62917 .31916 
HONEST .37831 .10471 .60606 
IMPORTANT .46618 .17159 .36980 
KIND .11953 .22602 .18789 
EXTROVERTED .09841 .55441 -.03737 
RELIABLE .51638 -.06550 .60357 
ACTIVE .13356 .35356 .23704 
FAIR .38042 .01512 .62626 
TRUTHFUL .42627 .14665 .63694 
ENERGETIC .05930 .20052 .32686 
FAMILIAR .03418 .13139 -.01307 
HELPFUL .50080 .15704 .50784 
SAFE .30348 .10171 .49545 
RELEVANT .58092 .17029 .39056 
ALOOF .04628 -.22339 -.10591 
APPEALING .18072 .50043 .08153 
INFORMED .64952 -.18067 .29380 
BELIEVABLE .63139 .12093 .46892 
UNSELFISH .10835 .28656 .44864 
JUST .32795 .26388 .55215 
TRAINED .67542 .12191 .09426 
CASUAL .04662 .42029 .04056 
EMPHATIC .25065 .03607 .29069 
AGGRESSIVE .01591 -.00067 .02211 
SURE .57730 .14786 .36602 
INTERESTED .29147 .06973 .44506 
EXPERIENCED .60491 .21342 .20752 
UNBIASED .06866 .14749 .48598 
QUALIFIED .74872 .03635 .27332 
PROFESSIONAL .64287 .36408 .06794 
MOTIVATED .41801 .02413 .22995 
.19027 
.61848 
.36613 
.20747 
.23705 
.01148 
.05454 
.13447 
.01530 
.09720 
.10784 
.25739 
.01921 
.16796 
.08143 
.14504 
.10504 
.00004 
.43714 
.27741 
.50369 
.07817 
.44571 
.13607 
.03690 
.47253 
.37894 
.20663 
.32378 
.17636 
.06028 
.04432 
.04932 
.01497 
.04721 
.18283 
.14047 
.09124 
.48055 
.68726 
.42905 
.04381 
.17016 
.14909 
.14235 
.11698 
.27201 
FACTOR LOADINGS FOR ROBERT YOUNG 
OPEN MINDED .28975 .27236 .56068 
BOLD .14380 .03183 .31261 
ENTHUSIASTIC .29830 .10354 .47810 
ATTRACTIVE .24482 .05261 .46566 
FRIENDLY .25153 .09816 .19593 
CONCERNED .31755 .33279 .17024 
KNOWLEDGEABLE .40817 .56815 .19585 
ABLE j .34921 .56166 .21839 
TRUSTWORTHY .56891 .39501 .37168 
ENTERTAINING .09570 .19274 .79466 
SINCERE .54971 .30886 .39235 
WARM .47092 .20046 .24136 
APPROPRIATE .43028 .51106 .08608 
FRANK .11830 .40612 .34037 
SKILLED .30795 .67721 .20902 
REASONABLE .65596 .29126 .45830 
INTERESTING .27538 .17543 .73600 
HONEST .51984 .32722 .28978 
IMPORTANT .45580 .45198 .36859 
KIND .55134 .26485 .18403 
EXTROVERTED .15692 .04891 .28905 
RELIABLE .52632 .39960 .19748 
ACTIVE .23279 .23458 .37707 
FAIR .73833 .21544 .09328 
TRUTHFUL .63963 .25282 .27049 
ENERGETIC .22479 .28216 .37145 
FAMILIAR .35767 .23442 .17448 
HELPFUL .59437 .36228 .29826 
SAFE .77143 .24455 .01615 
RELEVANT .48131 .43483 .16046 
ALOOF -.06495 .00147 -.01543 
APPEALING .47113 .24625 .49486 
INFORMED .41653 .63305 .26692 
BELIEVABLE .49683 .47357 .37998 
UNSELFISH .44490 .47061 .24232 
JUST .64784 .38641 .14493 
TRAINED .12363 .65537 -.01810 
CASUAL .00952 -.13532 .40939 
EMPHATIC -.04120 .05206 .09610 
AGGRESSIVE .01395 .15213 -.01376 
SURE .11513 .45449 .03857 
INTERESTED .18030 .52863 .20578 
EXPERIENCED .27934 .78762 .04725 
UNBIASED .46821 .42662 .30738 
QUALIFIED .25526 .81677 .02587 
PROFESSIONAL .18000 .71110 .14629 
MOTIVATED .10344 .27233 .04236 
.27856 
.12359 
.25857 
.31058 
.72348 
.65599 
.30993 
.20771 
.39130 
.08019 
.40029 
.49955 
-.03936 
.29302 
.12974 
.11147 
.17804 
.50552 
-.00133 
.58088 
-.22492 
.40574 
.05068 
.26507 
.46085 
.04107 
.24052 
.18803 
.14690 
-.01115 
-.42680 
.24161 
.24072 
.32488 
.34654 
.21034 
.07656 
.00740 
.26789 
.10436 
.51911 
.53684 
.13919 
.13075 
.06925 
.20995 
.21597 
FACTOR LOADINGS FOR THE LEVER BROTHERS CHEMIST 
OPEN MINDED .62381 .22503 .06266 .07597 
BOLD -.07733 .60703 .02891 -.06785 
ENTHUSIASTIC .08766 .63821 .01161 .16628 
ATTRACTIVE .09499 .65128 -.00368 -.03472 
FRIENDLY .23499 .46562 .12482 .29316 
CONCERNED .22278 .06693 .54449 .46159 
KNOWLEDGEABLE .11826 -.02194 .76068 .13921 
ABLE .25690 -.00187 .56866 .19593 
TRUSTWORTHY .78352 .11280 .20282 .08441 
ENTERTAINING .19559 .65990 -.07276 .32641 
SINCERE .71883 .18436 .22427 .21393 
WARM .27707 .38294 .11306 .66571 
APPROPRIATE .58073 .12919 .21265 .15087 
FRANK .47265 .15331 .24190 .22465 
SKILLED .23714 -.00015 .61807 .02535 
REASONABLE .67599 .09479 .20284 .13393 
INTERESTING .33220 .60834 -.00961 .01252 
HONEST .78815 .01581 .16500 .09376 
IMPORTANT .54859 .21062 .16994 .00479 
KIND .20999 .19891 .14501 .55624 
EXTROVERTED -.03950 .69282 -.04273 .27220 
RELIABLE .82932 .11276 .25726 .05411 
ACTIVE .03378 .69607 .21295 .25595 
FAIR .77885 .08402 .01041 .00818 
TRUTHFUL .86529 .00721 .20530 -.00213 
ENERGETIC .08820 .58920 .21467 .28218 
FAMILIAR .16252 .13533 .17215 .19161 
HELPFUL .76761 .17211 .30387 .14086 
SAFE .78860 .09724 .13904 .06928 
RELEVANT .66513 .11985 .30378 .12427 
ALOOF -.26055 -.29772 -.08036 -.03530 
APPEALING .48878 .50527 .12277 .15738 
INFORMED .40875 .06896 .62905 .14575 
BELIEVABLE .75665 .02909 .31211 .03672 
UNSELFISH .66301 .03994 .03346 .25450 
JUST .70293 .14853 .17264 .16751 
TRAINED .18484 .05930 .64912 -.12443 
CASUAL .13055 .41293 -.12690 .33588 
EMPHATIC .23170 .56490 .24854 -.01647 
AGGRESSIVE .09240 .69462 .03104 -.07385 
SAFE .10632 .41308 .62222 -.02002 
INTERESTED .26153 .37863 .46799 .23954 
EXPERIENCED .22571 .12740 .68951 .00080 
UNBIASED .44701 .01385 -.11844 .07108 
QUALIFIED .23483 .03228 .77354 .23683 
PROFESSIONAL .13448 .04348 .64085 -.00369 
MOTIVATED -.01043 .45461 .34418 -.11617 
156 
OPEN MINDED 
BOLD 
ENTHUSIASTIC 
ATTRACTIVE 
FRIENDLY 
CONCERNED 
KNOWLEDGEABLE 
ABLE 
TRUSTWORTHY 
ENTERTAINING 
SINCERE 
WARM 
APPROPRIATE 
FRANK 
SKILLED 
REASONABLE 
INTERESTING 
HONEST 
IMPORTANT 
KIND 
EXTROVERTED 
RELIABLE 
ACTIVE 
FAIR 
TRUTHFUL 
ENERGETIC 
FAMILIAR 
HELPFUL 
SAFE 
RELEVANT 
ALOOF 
APPEALING 
INFORMED 
BELIEVABLE 
UNSELFISH 
JUST 
TRAINED 
CASUAL 
EMPHATIC 
AGGRESSIVE 
SURE 
INTERESTED 
EXPERIENCED 
UNBIASED 
QUALIFIED 
PROFESSIONAL 
MOTIVATED 
FACTOR LOADINGS FOR BOB HOPE 
.71360 .15152 
-.01259 .08112 
.50550 .07634 
.37696 -.02472 
.61412 -.02608 
.62043 .23206 
.51537 .46629 
.51836 .54434 
.76491 .17759 
.64786 -.01936 
.78845 .12829 
.58531 .04587 
.61626 .30344 
.30549 .04898 
.37374 .65426 
.68443 .16822 
.57345 .09023 
.77817 .16283 
.61755 .30404 
.55108 .11514 
.03139 -.03694 
.77609 .17409 
.11265 .19397 
.67462 .10899 
.78741 .16140 
.30326 .20280 
.21847 .22271 
.72525 .19231 
.55914 .26629 
.58901 .34159 
-.06399 .09466 
.69702 .05593 
.59345 .46962 
.80705 .26580 
.61989 .11356 
.62277 .25755 
.20338 .78612 
-.06147 .01490 
.14239 .03310 
-.18469 .22109 
.13354 .39294 
.40395 .35102 
.16587 .80960 
.44125 .26897 
.40299 .73139 
.12646 .65816 
.11929 .28979 
.02559 .05977 
.47137 .10717 
.44976 .08183 
.47240 -.14714 
.42100 .07738 
.09273 .05720 
.07653 .09783 
.14617 .01599 
.14120 .08993 
.35007 .00477 
.12626 .23980 
.38353 .24521 
.09646 -.18678 
.37843 -.06435 
.12356 .12329 
.14284 -.12948 
.38040 .12602 
-.02225 .21428 
.14941 -.06470 
.23894 .35356 
.51738 .15238 
.06498 .14523 
.55109 .39547 
.02872 .14358 
.00707 .17258 
.60741 .19944 
.46553 -.09635 
.02412 .13496 
-.10137 .24015 
.13515 -.17824 
-.10101 -.47423 
.38805 -.00917 
-.00013 .29436 
.01522 .12260 
.08873 .16147 
-.00138 .18321 
.08811 -.03138 
.40747 .06825 
.62872 .00495 
.66798 .07640 
.19782 .53249 
.13390 .54825 
.19780 .17433 
-.03910 -.12437 
.02411 .01873 
.12276 .19091 
.17842 .52771 
FACTOR LOADINGS FOR JOHNNY CARSON 
OPEN MINDED .46752 .08069 .31068 
BOLD -.03769 .04537 .01417 
ENTHUSIASTIC .18331 .11325 .68646 
ATTRACTIVE .07882 -.01025 .86642 
FRIENDLY .21105 -.03090 .63151 
CONCERNED .28508 .07606 .07181 
KNOWLEDGEABLE .27994 .29692 .03715 
ABLE .20254 .61153 .18187 
TRUSTWORTHY .65948 .16103 .08550 
ENTERTAINING .15336 .15022 .68615 
SINCERE .38908 .03591 .24910 
WARM .35394 .04333 .41661 
APPROPRIATE .32780 .51773 .22779 
FRANK .36678 .10887 -.00287 
SKILLED .03311 .74541 .17093 
REASONABLE .36708 .44163 -.02208 
INTERESTING .21059 .18823 .62060 
HONEST .69424 .01129 .10286 
IMPORTANT .34266 .24894 .38173 
KIND .32233 -.04334 .30895 
EXTROVERTED .00918 .10718 .12761 
RELIABLE .58638 .29431 .22102 
ACTIVE .01196 .27421 .35579 
FAIR .68904 .15480 .13584 
TRUTHFUL .73576 .03780 .14137 
ENERGETIC .07194 .09597 .41873 
HELPFUL .62362 .16389 .19366 
SAFE .48049 .30967 .27644 
RELEVANT .62818 .30214 .08785 
ALOOF -.01305 -.17505 -.18197 
APPEALING .25415 .14890 .73268 
INFORMED .32230 .29875 .10348 
BELIEVABLE .72024 .30229 .19469 
UNSELFISH .55759 -.03976 .09052 
JUST .56603 .09079 .01958 
TRAINED .15491 .71216 .13338 
CASUAL .24132 .05813 .10233 
EMPHATIC .14885 .09870 .08887 
AGGRESSIVE -.12227 .13674 .22791 
SURE .31079 .21926 .18199 
INTERESTED .35238 .43830 .13161 
EXPERIENCED .08720 .71733 -.07075 
UNBIASED .57149 .13926 :: .20422 
QUALIFIED .40117 .60180 .06114 
PROFESSIONAL .04047 .69262 .14473 
MOTIVATED -.05461 .49597 -.16269 
FAMILIAR .04922 .17511 .15041 
.28017 
.46294 
.23296 
.17748 
.37119 
-.05215 
.01677 
.23500 
.13619 
.35513 
.01417 
.23514 
.05839 
.47915 
.16248 
.12586 
.09620 
.10401 
.02607 
.12817 
.52195 
.09464 
.40791 
.20064 
.05497 
.63303 
.06462 
-.06216 
-.17274 
-.16860 
.00374 
.22351 
.15661 
.08725 
.06707 
.09412 
.60225 
.53012 
.38825 
.54525 
.05318 
.26640 
.02603 
.01978 
.12816 
.27043 
.32317 
OPEN MINDED 
BOLD 
ENTHUSIASTIC 
ATTRACTIVE 
FRIENDLY 
CONCERNED 
KNOWLEDGEABLE 
ABLE 
TRUSTWORTHY 
ENTERTAINING 
SINCERE 
WARM 
APPROPRIATE 
FRANK 
SKILLED 
REASONABLE 
INTERESTING 
HONEST 
IMPORTANT 
KIND 
EXTROVERTED 
RELIABLE 
ACTIVE 
FAIR 
TRUTHFUL 
ENERGETIC 
FAMILIAR 
HELPFUL 
SAFE 
RELEVANT 
ALOOF 
APPEALING 
INFORMED 
BELIEVABLE 
UNSELFISH 
JUST 
TRAINED 
CASUAL 
EMPHATIC 
AGGRESSIVE 
SURE 
INTERESTED 
EXPERIENCED 
UNBIASED 
QUALIFIED 
PROFESSIONAL 
MOTIVATED 
FACTOR LOADINGS FOR THE FOUR CHOSEN SPOKESMEN 
.54921 -.00450 
-.05296 -.02161 
.21536 .10613 
.05859 -.07020 
.14802 -.07726 
.43785 .43530 
.33621 .63716 
.28623 .68271 
.75596 .27664 
.02714 -.18329 
.68204 .22277 
.32140 .02848 
.49087 .53253 
.44785 .28176 
.20965 .79780 
.58100 .40309 
.21002 -.01765 
.79446 .20269 
.53089 .39981 
.39125 .02639 
-.08160 -.12448 
.74825 .38213 
.05817 .15301 
.77079 .15412 
.84570 .20372 
.06776 .05196 
.07917 -.19641 
.73288 .33742 
.67540 .27507 
.59120 .48438 
-.17707 -.05022 
.31163 -.01071 
.42558 .63957 
.72575 .44205 
.62462 .06044 
.70933 .22892 
.15405 .76634 
.02167 -.21534 
.21058 .17515 
-.08553 .02052 
.28325 .48780 
.39967 .49646 
.21009 .77240 
.56283 .01372 
.32448 .75503 
.18409 .72800 
.12885 .49741 
.37026 .08844 
.64906 -.10110 
.58710 .13121 
.69053 .20568 
.57544 .47062 
-.33151 .28961 
-.39949 .10057 
.01254 .05673 
.02526 .19573 
.81130 .12703 
-.01931 .32893 
.37380 .68615 
-.11015 -.03007 
.17877 .03189 
-.04480 -.00868 
.06954 .12191 
.72940 .09705 
.03187 .17497 
.19809 -.09318 
.22129 .63000 
.77227 .04661 
-.00696 .08045 
.69637 .03250 
.09830 .11533 
-.02669 .12949 
.72460 .09814 
.48720 .27291 
.06997 .06350 
.04549 .07820 
-.08315 -.12740 
-.16073 -.28862 
.64825 .24041 
-.18281 -.01628 
-.01289 .03521 
.12026 .30477 
.07390 .17476 
-.10955 .02270 
.62767 .09389 
.37283 .03828 
.66552 -.09800 
.22914 .04478 
-.04888 .23041 
.02013 -.01764 
.23625 .06456 
-.20508 -.10744 
.04142 .04550 
.02626 .06075 
APPENDIX C 
PRE-TEST OF MESSAGE 
AND 
THE FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
QUESTIONNAIRE #1 
PRE-TEST OF MESSAGE 
QUESTIONNAIRE #1 
TEST MARKET QUESTIONNAIRE 
Professor Gordon Paul, the chairman of our Marketing depart¬ 
ment, has been doing some consulting for Market Research Corpo¬ 
ration of America, Inc. (MRCA). 
MRCA works closely with manufacturers in setting up an in 
monitoring test markets. Currently, Lever Brothers, Inc., is test 
marketing a new brand of toothpaste in the Fort Wayne, Indiana, 
market area. Professor Paul has access to many of the test market 
materials and has agreed to let me reproduce a script from an adver¬ 
tisement for the new toothpaste. 
On the next page is a copy of the verbal portion of a 30- 
second advertisement for the new toothpaste. Please read it to 
learn something about the brand. 
GO TO THE NEXT PAGE 
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QUESTIONNAIRE #1 (cont'd) 
SCRIPT 
"Hii I'm here to tell you about a new toothpaste called 
VISTA. VISTA has received the seal of approval of the American 
Dental Association. But it's not just another fluoride toothpaste. 
The fluoride compound used in VISTA made it possible for Lever 
Brothers to offer you a decay preventive toothpaste that is low 
in abrasives but high in whitening ability. 
I really like the taste of VISTA. After brushing with VISTA 
my mouth feels clean. Best of all, both fresh taste and cleaner 
teeth are possible without sacrificing decay prevention. 
TRY IT! 
QUESTIONNAIRE #1 (cont'd) 
(page 3) 
EXPLANATION 
As you probably already know, one of the reasons for test 
market activities is to "fine tune" the marketing mix prior to 
national roll-out. Changes will probably be made in distribution, 
pricing, advertising, and packaging. 
I am interested in predicting possible changes in Lever 
Brothers' advertising strategy. The next page has some questions 
about the advertising you have just read. (Don't go to them yet!) 
These are the types of questions consumers are being asked in 
Fort Wayne. If you feel that you did not understand the adver¬ 
tisement, go back and read it again. However, after you turn this 
page, DO NOT RETURN TO THE ADVERTISEMENT. I would like to repli¬ 
cate the test market situation as closely as possible. Consumers 
in Fort Wayne will have had repeated exposure to the advertisement, 
but will bot be able to refer to it while answering questions. 
After you have read and understand the advertisement, please 
turn the page. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE #1 (cont'd) 
(page 4) 
DO NOT RETURN TO THE AD 
Please put a check mark ( ) in the interval that most 
accurately reflects your feelings about each of the following 
statements. 
VISTA toothpaste prevents cavities about as well as the other 
brands of fluoride toothpaste. 
Very :::::: Very 
Improbable Probable 
VISTA toothpaste works like a mouthwash. 
Very ::::::_ Very 
Improbable Probable 
VISTA toothpaste whitens teeth better than any of the other 
brands of fluoride toothpaste. 
Very ::::::_ Very 
Improbable Probable 
VISTA toothpaste tastes good. 
Very :::::: Very 
Improbable Probable 
VISTA toothpaste prevents cavities better than any other 
brand of fluoride toothpaste. 
Very :::::: Very 
Improbable Probable 
VISTA toothpaste whitens teeth about as well as the other brands 
of fluoride toothpaste. 
Very ::::::_ Very 
Improbable Probable 
VISTA toothpaste is low in abrasion. 
Very ::::::_ Very 
Improbable Probable 
VISTA toothpaste prevents cavities. 
Very : : : : 
Improbable 
VISTA toothpaste whitens teeth. 
Very : : : : 
Improbable 
Very 
Probable 
Very 
Probable 
GO TO THE NEXT PAGE 
165 
QUESTIONNAIRE #1 (cont'd) 
(page 5) 
DO NOT RETURN TO THE AD 
We all have certain beliefs, based on past experience, about 
toothpastes in general. 
In the space below please list other kinds of things (e.g., 
product attributes, consequences of using VISTA toothpaste, etc.) 
that you think might be true about this new Lever Brothers' 
« 
toothpaste. Include only things that were not specifically men¬ 
tioned in the advertisement, but may have been implied by it. 
For example, you may think that it is very probable that 
VISTA toothpaste comes in a tube and is white. 
GO TO THE NEXT PAGE 
QUESTIONNAIRE #1 (cont'd) 
(page 6) 
On this page you are asked to judge four different purchase 
possibilities on sets of scales. Please place a check mark in 
the space that most accurately reflects your assessment of the 
purchase situation. 
Buying and using CREST toothpaste is: 
Wise :::::: Foolish 
Good :::::: Bad 
Beneficial :::::: Harmful 
Rewarding ::::::_ Punishing 
Buying and using VISTA toothpaste is: 
Wise : : : : 
Good : : : : 
Beneficial : : : : 
Rewarding : : : : 
Foolish 
Bad 
Harmful 
Punishing 
Buying and using ULTRA BRITE toothpaste is: 
Wise : : : : : 
Good : : : : : 
Beneficial : : : : : 
Rewarding : : : : : 
Foolish 
Bad 
Harmful 
Punishing 
GO TO THE NEXT PAGE 
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QUESTIONNAIRE #1 (cont'd) 
(page 7) 
Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad 
^—^Please rate the following statements on the above scale. 
.Circle)the number that reflects your ov/n opinion on each statement. 
A circle abound the number (T) means that you think the statement 
is good, Qj indicates bad. The other numbers represent different 
degrees of good to bad. 
Purchasing and using a fluoride toothpaste that 
is low in abrasion is: 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Purchasing and using a fluoride toothpaste that 
whitens teeth is: 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Purchasing and using a fluoride toothpaste that 
works like a mouthwash is: 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Purchasing and using a fluoride 
prevents cavities is: 
Purchasing and using a fluoride 
tastes good is: 
Purchasing and using a fluoride 
prevents cavities about as well 
toothpastes is: 
Purchasing and using a fluoride 
whitens teeth better than other 
fluoride toothpaste is: 
toothpaste that 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
toothpaste that 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
toothpaste that 
as other fluoride 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
toothpaste that 
brands of 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Purchasing and using a fluoride toothpaste that 
prevents cavities better than other brands of 
fluoride toothpaste is: 1234567 
Purchasing and using a fluoride toothpaste that 
whitens teeth about as well as other fluoride 
toothpastes is: 1234567 
GO TO THE NEXT PAGE 
QUESTIONNAIRE #1 (cont'd) 
(page 8) 
Now I would like a little information about you. 
Are you Male Female (circle one) 
What is your academic major ? _ 
Do you purchase toothpaste? Yes No (circle one) 
What year ore you in? _ 
What other marketing courses are you currently taking? 
THANK YOU 
QUESTIONNAIRE #2 
EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
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QUESTIONNAIRE #2 
TEST MARKET QUESTIONNAIRE 
Professor Gordon Paul, the chairman of our Marketing department, 
has been doing some consulting for Market Research Corporation of 
America, Inc. (MRCA). 
MRCA works closely with manufacturers in setting up and in moni¬ 
toring test markets. Currently, Lever Brothers, Inc., is test market¬ 
ing a new brand of toothpaste in the Fort Wayne, Indiana, market area. 
Professor Paul has access to many of the test market materials for the 
new toothpaste. 
On the next page is a copy of the verbal portion of a 30-second 
advertisement for the new toothpaste. Please read it to learn some¬ 
thing about the brand. 
GO TO THE NEXT PAGE 
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QUESTIONNAIRE #2 (cont'd) 
(page 2) 
Voice script of a 30-second television 
advertisement for VISTA toothpaste 
Off-camera voice: -varied; variations are listed on the 
page after this sample questionnaire- 
—varied— Hi! I'd like to tell you about a new toothpaste 
called VISTA. VISTA is made with a new type of 
fluoride. But it's not just another fluoride 
toothpaste. 
The fluoride compound used in VISTA made it possible 
for Lever Brothers to offer you a better decay 
preventive toothpaste that is lower in abrasives, 
yet higher in whitening ability, than other brands 
of fluoride toothpaste. 
I really like the taste of VISTA. After brushing 
with VISTA my mouth feels clean. Best of all, with 
VISTA both fresh taste and cleaner teeth are 
possible, and you don't have to sacrifice decay 
prevention. TRY VISTA 
172 
QUESTIONNAIRE #2 (cont'd) 
(page 3) 
EXPLANATION 
As you probably already know, one of the reasons for test market 
activities is to "fine tune" the marketing mix prior to national roll¬ 
out. Changes will probably be made in distribution, pricing, adver¬ 
tising, and packaging. 
There are several criteria for choosing a test market. One of 
the important ones is that it must be relatively isolated, media-wise, 
from other, non-test-market areas. That is, it must possess its own 
television station, radio stations and newspapers, and be beyond the 
reach of these media from other areas. Not all test markets meet all 
the standards—trade-offs must occasionally be made. Fort Wayne, 
Indiana, is one of several market areas that do^ meet the requirements. 
Lever Brothers is using Fort Wayne as only one test market for 
VISTA. Different combinations of the elements of the marketing mix 
are being tried in other areas in an effort to find the best combination. 
Some changes will undoubtedly be made. 
I am interested in predicting possible changes in Lever Brothers' 
advertising strategy. The next few pages have some questions about the 
advertising you have just read. (Don't go to them yet!) These are the 
types of questions consumers are being asked in Fort Wayne. If you 
feel that you did not understand the advertisement, go back and read 
it again. However, after you turn this page, DO NOT RETURN TO THE ADVER¬ 
TISEMENT. I would like to replicate the test market situation as closely 
as possible. Consumers in Fort Wayne will have had repeated exposure to 
the advertisement, but will not be able to refer to it while answering 
questions. 
After you have read and understand the advertisement, please 
turn the page. 
QUESTIONNAIRE #2 (cont'd) 
(page 4) 
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PLEASE STAY ON THIS PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL QUESTIONS ON IT. DO NOTTURN 
BACK. DO NOT TURN AHEAD. 
Now that you have become somewhat familiar with VISTA toothpaste, we would like 
to ask you some questions about It. This Is NOT A QUIZ concerning the contents of the 
advertisement. Rather, it is a measure of what YOU BELIEVE about thls^ew brand. 
Please answer the following questions by placing a check mark (✓) In the Interval 
that most nearly reflects your belief about each of the statements concerning VT5TA 
toothpaste. 
Very 
Improbable 
Very 
Probable 
VISTA toothpaste tastes good. 
VISTA toothpaste has the seal of approval 
of the American Dental Association. 
VISTA's fluoride compound prevents cavities 
better than other brands of fluoride 
toothpaste. 
VISTA toothpaste works like a mouthwash. 
VISTA toothpaste Is made by Lever Brothers. 
VISTA toothpaste Is higher In whitening 
ability than other brands of fluoride 
toothpaste. 
VISTA toothpaste is not just another 
fluoride toothpaste. 
VISTA toothpaste Is lower in abrasives than 
other brands of fluoride toothpaste. 
Brushing with VISTA makes your mouth 
feel clean. 
VISTA is a new toothpaste. 
VISTA toothpaste sells at about the same 
price as other national brands of 
fluoride toothpaste. 
VISTA gives you fresh taste and cleaner 
teeth without sacrificing decay prevention. 
VISTA toothpaste prevents cavities. 
VISTA toothpaste whitens teeth. 
GO TO THE NEXT PAGE 
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QUESTIONNAIRE #2 (cont'd) 
(page 5) 
PLEASE STAY ON THIS PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL QUESTIONS ON IT. DO NOT TURN 
BACK. DO NOT TURN AHEAD. 
As you may already know, markets are often segmented on the basis of product 
characteristics. For example, there may be a large number of people who prefer 
a toothpaite that Is high In whitening power and "sex appeal". Another segment 
may be more concerned with cavity prevention and germ killing ability. What 
all this means is that different people have different likes and dislikes. On 
this page and the next, please tell us something about YOUR likes and dislikes 
concerning toothpaste by placing a check mark (*/*) In the Interval that most 
accurately reflects the degree of IMPORTANCE you attribute to each of the fol¬ 
lowing characteristics of toothpaste. 
In making a purchase decision between brands 
of toothpaste: 
Very Very 
Unimportant Important 
Low abrasiveness Is: :::::: 
Good taste is: 
Whitening ability is: 
The seal of approval of the 
American Dental Association Is: 
The ability to work like a mouthwash Is: 
Cavity prevention Is: 
The presence of a superior fluoride 
compound Is: 
How interested are you In differences among brands of toothpaste? 
Extremely Not at all 
Interested ::::::_Interested 
How confident are you in you ability to judge between different brands of 
toothpaste? 
Extremely Not at all 
Confldent :::::: Confident 
GO TO THE NEXT PAGE 
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QUESTIONNAIRE n (cont'd) 
(page 6) 
PLEASE STAY ON THIS PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL QUESTIONS ON IT. DO NOT TURN 
BACK. DO NOT TURN AHEAD. 
These questions refer to ANY BRAND of toothpaste. That Is, we are Interested 
In your feelings about purchasing and using toothpaste IN GENERAL. Please evaluate 
each of the following statements from BAD to GOOD. 
Purchasing and using a fluoride toothpaste that: 
tastes good Is; Bad ; ; • • • • : : Good 
has the seal of approval of the American 
Dental Association Is; Bad : : • • • • : : Good 
whitens teeth is; Bad : : • • • • : : Good 
gives you a fresh taste and cleaner teeth 
without sacrificing decay prevention Is; Bad : : • • * : : Good 
is made with a new type of fluoride is; Bad : : • • • • : : Good 
prevents cavities Is; Bad : : • • • • : : Good 
has a fluoride compound that prevents 
cavities better than other brands of 
fluoride toothpaste is; Bad : : • • • • : : Good 
sells at about the same price as other 
national brands of fluoride toothpaste 
Is; Bad : : : : Good 
works like a mouthwash Is; Bad : : : ; Good 
is new is; Bad : : : : Good 
makes your mouth feel clean is; Bad : : : : Good 
Is made by Lever Brothers is; Bad : : : : Good 
Is lower In abrasives than other brands 
of fluoride toothpaste is; Bad : : • • • • : : Good 
is not just another fluoride toothpaste is: Bad : : • • • • : : Good 
is higher in whitening ability than other 
brands of fluoride toothpaste is; Bad : : • • • • : : Good 
GO TO THE NEXT PAGE 
QUESTIONNAIRE #2 (cont'd) 
(page 7) 
176 
PLEASE STAY ON THIS PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL QUESTIONS ON IT. DO NO TURN 
BACK. DO NOT TURN AHEAD. 
On this page, please think about C-varied--3 , who 
gave you the Information about VISTA toothpaste. 
Try to answer these questions AS YOU BELIEVE HE WOULD ANSWER THEM. Study 
the following example. 
Jaws was the best motion picture of 1975. 
Very \r\ : : : 
Improbable 
: : Very 
Probable 
Explanation: 
The above check mark would mean that you thlnkf—varled-3 believes that It 
is very Improbable that Jawa was the best motion picture of 1975. 
Now enter your guesses atC—varied—3 ratings. 
Very Very 
Improbable Probable 
VISTA toothpaste tastes good. • ••••• •  
VISTA toothpaste whitens teeth. • ••••• •  
VISTA toothpaste has the seal of approval 
of the American Dental Association. • ••••• •  
VISTA toothpaste prevents cavities. • ••••• •  
VISTA toothpaste sells at about the 
same price as other national brands 
of fluoride toothpaste. • ••••• 
VISTA toothpaste prevents cavities 
better than other brands of 
fluoride toothpaste. • ••••• •  
VISTA toothpaste Is lower In abrasives 
than other brands of fluoride 
toothpaste. • ••••• •  
VISTA toothpaste works like a mouth¬ 
wash. • ••••• •  
VISTA toothpaste whitens teeth better 
than other brands of fluoride tooth¬ 
paste. 
GO TO THE NEXT PAGE 
QUESTIONNAIRE #2 (cont'd) 
(page 8) 
177 
PLEASE STAY ON THIS PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL QUESTIONS ON IT. DO NOT TURN 
BACK. DO NOT TURN AHEAD. 
Continue thinking aboutf-.varied.3. who told you about VISTA toothpaste. 
Place a check mark {f) In the Interval that most accurately reflects your feellnqs about 
him as a spokesman for VISTA. 
Interesting 
Professional 
Trustworthy 
Experienced 
Attractive, 
Helpful 
Reliable 
Skilled 
Entertaining 
Hones t_ 
Fa1r_ 
Energet1c_ 
Trained_ 
Truthful 
_Dul 1 
.Unprofessional 
Untrustworthy 
.Inexperienced 
.Ugly 
Unhelpful 
Unreliable 
Unskilled 
.Boring 
Dishonest 
Unfair 
T1 red 
Untrained 
Deceiving 
Please Dut a check mark (^f In the Interval that most accurately reflects 
your assessment of the following statement. 
Purchasing and using VISTA toothpaste Is: 
Wise 
Good 
Beneficial 
Reward1ng_ 
Foolish 
Bad 
Harmful 
Punishing 
GO TO THE NEXT PAGE 
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QUESTIONNAIRE #2 (cont’d) 
(page 9) 
PLEASE STAY ON THIS PAGE UNTIL YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL QUESTIONS ON IT. DO NOT TURN 
BACK. 
On this final page, we’d like some Information about you and your Impression of 
this questionnaire. 
Are you Male Female (circle one) 
Please circle the courses In which you are currently enrolled. Fill In the section 
numbers or meeting days and times. 
course section 
Mgt 201 
Fin 201 
course section 
Mktg 201 
Mktg 210 _ 
course section 
Acct 120 
Mktg 222 _ 
Do you have a favorite brand of toothpaste? YES NO (circle one) 
If "yes", what Is the brand? _ 
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (circle answer) 
1. "All fluoride toothpastes are equally effective for my needs." 
Strongly 
agree 
Moderately Slightly Neither agree 
agree agree nor disagree 
Slightly Moderately Strongly 
disagree disagree disagree 
2. "All toothpastes are equally effective for my needs." 
Strongly 
agree 
Moderately Slightly Neither agree 
agree agree nor disagree 
Slightly Moderately 
disagree disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
State In your own words what you think the researcher was trying to prove In this 
research. 
Did you use any particular pattern or auldelines In answering this questionnaire? 
YES NO 
If "yes", what were they? 
It will be at least two weeks before all the data for this research Is collected. 
We would appreciate It very much If, during that time, you do not discuss this 
questionnaire with anyone. 
We'll try to fill you In on some results before the end of the semester. 
THANK YOU 
QUESTIONNAIRE #2 
SUPPLEMENT 
VARIATIONS IN SPOKESMAN INTRODUCTION 
High trust, high competence: 
Hear what Doctor John Hunt, a practicing dentist 
in Cleveland, Ohio, has to say about new VISTA 
toothpaste. 
High trust, low competence: 
We‘re on the set of the popular television series, 
Marcus Wei by. Robert Young, the star of the series, 
has something to tell you about new VISTA toothpaste. 
Low trust, high competence: 
We're in one of the research laboratories at Lever 
Brothers. This is Doctor Harold Carlson, one of a 
team of research chemists here at Lever Brothers, 
with a word about new VISTA toothpaste. 
Low trust, low competence: 
We're on the set of THE TONIGHT SHOW, STARRING 
JOHNNY CARSON. Johnny has something to tell you 
about new VISTA toothpaste. Here's Johnny. 
QUESTIONNAIRE #3 
CONTROL GROUP QUESTIONNAIRE 
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QUESTIONNAIRE #3 
(control group) 
TEST MARKET QUESTIONNAIRE 
Professor Gordon Paul, the chairman of our Marketing department, 
has been doing some consulting for Market Research Corporation of 
America, Inc. (MRCA). 
MRCA works closely with manufacturers in setting up and in moni¬ 
toring test markets. Currently, Lever Brothers, Inc., is test market¬ 
ing a new bcand of toothpaste in the Fort Wayne, Indiana, market area. 
The brand name of this fluoride toothpaste is VISTA. 
One of the reasons for test market activities of this type is 
to "fine tune" the marketing mix prior to national roll-out. Changes 
will probably be made in distribution, pricing, advertising, and 
packaging. 
There are several criteria for choosing a test market. One of 
the important ones is that it must be relatively isolated, media-wise, 
from other, non-test-market areas. That is, it must possess its own 
televison station, radio stations and newspapers, and be beyond the 
reach of these media from other areas. Not all test markets meet all 
the standards—trade-offs must occasionally be made. Fort Wayne, 
Indiana, is one of several market areas that d£ meet the requirements. 
Lever Brothers is using Fort Wayne as only one test market for 
VISTA. Different combinations of the elements of the marketing mix 
are being tried in other areas in an effort to find the best combina¬ 
tion. Some changes will undoubtedly be made. 
In this questionnaire, I am primarily interested in finding out 
what YOU probably believe about a new toothpaste. On the following 
pages there are some questions asking for your beliefs about VISTA, 
and some questions on toothpaste use in general. 
GO TO THE NEXT PAGE 
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QUESTIONNAIRE #3 (cont'd) 
(page 2) 
Please answer the questions by placing a check mark (v/j In the Interval that 
most accurately reflects your beliefs. 
Study the following example. 
VISTA toothpaste comes In a tube: 
Very : : : 
Improbable 
: : : Very 
Probable 
Explanation: 
The above check mark would mean that you believe that It Is very probable 
that VISTA comes In a tube. 
NOTE that you really don't know anything about VISTA, except that It exists. 
However, based on your knowledge of toothpaste In general, you may think that It 
probably comes In a tube._ 
The following questions are similar. With no other Information, what are your beliefs 
about VISTA? 
VISTA toothpaste tastes good. 
Very Very 
Improbable Probable 
• ••••• •  
VISTA toothpaste has the seal of 
approval of the American Dental 
Association. • ••••• •  
VISTA's fluoride compound 
prevents cavities better than other 
brands of fluoride toothpaste. • ••••• 
VISTA toothpaste works like a 
mouthwash. • ••••• •  
VISTA toothpaste Is made by Lever 
Brothers. • ••••• •  
VISTA toothpaste Is higher In whitening 
ability than other brands of 
fluoride toothpaste. • ••••* • • • • • 
VISTA toothpaste Is not just another 
fluoride toothpaste. • ••••• 
VISTA toothpaste Is lower In abrasives 
than other brands of fluoride toothpaste. • ••••• • • • • • • ( 
Brushing with VISTA makes your mouth 
feel clean. 
• ••••• 
VISTA Is a new toothpaste. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE #3 (cont'd) 
(page 3) 
Very 
Improbable 
Very 
Probable 
VISTA toothpaste sells at about the 
same price as other national brands 
of fluoride toothpaste. 
VISTA toothpaste Is made with a 
new type of fluoride. 
VISTA gives you fresh taste and 
cleaner teeth without sacrificing 
decay prevention. 
VISTA toothpaste prevents cavities. 
VISTA toothpaste whitens teeth. 
As you may already know, markets are often segmented on the basis of product char- 
characteristics. For example, there may be a large number of people who prefer a tooth¬ 
paste that is high in whitening power and "sex appeal". Another segment may be more 
concerned with cavity prevention and germ killing ability. What all this means Is that 
different people have different likes and dislikes. On this page and the next, please 
tell us something about YOUR likes and dislikes concerning toothpaste by placing a check 
mark ( ) in the Interval that most accurately reflects the degree of IMPORTANCE you 
attribute to each of the following characteristics of toothpaste. 
In making a purchase decision between 
brands of toothpaste: 
Very Very 
Unimportant Important 
Low abrasiveness Is; :::::: 
Good taste is; :::::: 
Whitening ability is; :::::: 
The seal of approval of the 
American Dental Association is; :::::: 
The ability to work like a 
mouthwash Is; :::::: 
Cavity prevention Is; 
The presence of a superior 
fluoride compound Is; : : : : = : 
How Interested are you in differences among brands of toothpaste? 
Extremely Not at all 
Interested :_:_:_:_:_|_Interested 
QUESTIONNAIRE #3 (cont'd) 
(page 4) 
184 
# 
How confident are you In your ability to judge between different brands of toothpaste? 
Extremely Not at all 
Conf 1 dent_:_:_:_:_:_: Confident 
These questions refer to ANY BRAND of toothpaste. That Is, we are Interested In 
your feelings about purchasing and using toothpaste IN GENERAL. Please evaluate each of 
the following statements from BAD to GOOD. 
Purchasing and using a fluoride 
toothpaste that: 
tastes good Is: Bad :::::: Good 
has the seal of approval of the 
American Dental Association Is; Bad :::::: Good 
whitens teeth is; Bad :::::: Good 
gives you a fresh taste and cleaner 
teeth without sacrificing decay 
prevention Is; Bad :::::: Good 
is made with a new type of 
fluoride Is; Bad :::::: Good 
prevents cavities Is; Bad :::::: Good 
has a fluoride compound that prevents 
cavities better than other brands 
of fluoride toothpaste Is; Bad :::::: Good 
sells at about the same price as 
other national brands of fluoride 
toothpaste Is; Bad :::::: Good 
works like a mouthwash Is; Bad :::::: Good 
Is new is; Bad :::::: Good 
makes your mouth feel clean Is; Bad :::::: Good 
Is made by Lever Brothers Is; Bad :::::: Good 
Is lower In abrasives than other 
brands of fluoride toothpaste Is; Bad :::::: Good 
Is not just another fluoride 
toothpaste Is; Bad :::::: Good 
Is higher in whitening ability than 
other brands of fluoride toothpaste Is; Bad : : : : : : Pood 
t 
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QUESTIONNAIRE #3 (cont'd) 
(pages 5 and 6) 
Two versions of the control group questionnaire contained a 
direct measure of attitude as in the experimental instrument. They 
differed in contexts. A third yersion contained no attitude measure. 
The last page of all control group questionnaires was identical 
to the last page of the experimental questionnaire. 
APPENDIX D 
TABLES OF MEAN CHANGE SCORES 
AND 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLES 
FOR 
EXPERIMENTAL DATA 
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